Environmental & Architectural Phenomenology. Vol. 25, No. 3 by Kansas State University. Architecture Department
Environmental & Architectural Phenomenology 
Volume 25 
Number 3 Article 1 
9-23-2014 
Environmental & Architectural Phenomenology. Vol. 25, No. 3 
Kansas State University. Architecture Department 
Follow this and additional works at: https://newprairiepress.org/eap 
 
Vol. 25, No. 3, Fall 2014 (includes “items of interest,” “anniversary issue introduction,” and 
essays by various authors). 
 
Recommended Citation 
Kansas State University. Architecture Department (2014) "Environmental & Architectural Phenomenology. 
Vol. 25, No. 3," Environmental & Architectural Phenomenology: Vol. 25: No. 3. 
This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by New Prairie Press. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Environmental & Architectural Phenomenology by an authorized administrator of New Prairie Press. For more 
information, please contact cads@k-state.edu. 




Vol. 25 ▪ No. 3 (DOI: 10.13140/2.1.1134.0161)      ISSN 1083–9194              www.arch.ksu.edu/seamon/EAP.html                        Fall ▪ 2014
 
1990–2014: Special 25th-anniversary issue! 
 
 
his EAP celebrates 25 years of publication. 
In early spring, EAP editor David Seamon 
sent out invitations to contribute an essay 
for a special fall issue. In response, Seamon 
received the 19 entries that follow. To accommodate 
this issue’s length as a paper copy, we have used a 
triple-column, ten-point format. The digital version 
remains in the usual two-column, 12-point format. 
In his introduction to this anniversary issue, Sea-
mon reproduces the list of potential questions that he 
suggested contributors might address (see p. 8). 
Though few of the entries answer these questions di-
rectly, one notes that they underlie many of the au-
thors’ concerns and serve as pointers toward im-
portant matters that may mark the future of environ-
mental and architectural phenomenology. 
One of these matters is the impact of digital in-
formation, hyperspace, and virtual reality on real-
world places, life, and events. This concern affects 
EAP immediately, since this will be the last paper 
issue—production and especially postage costs have 
become too much to bear. As readers know, EAP is 
already available in an open-source digital version. 
With the elimination of paper copies, we will no 
longer send out a subscription request in fall issues. 
In lieu of subscriptions, we ask that readers make a 
donation for whatever amount they feel EAP is worth 
(see back page), since we still have production ex-
penses. 
We thank those readers who have supported 
EAP over the last 25 years. At its peak, in the late 
1990s, our subscription list reached 150. Since open 
access, however, our paid readership has plummeted; 
in 2014, we received subscriptions from only 41 in-
dividuals and ten academic libraries. Though this 
loss in subscribership is discouraging, there is an en-
couraging side too. Since it became open source, 
EAP has been seen by many more readers than paper 
copies could generate.   For example, (cont. on p.  2) 
 
Below: Booleroo Backyard–Panel 3, 60 x 213cm, 2014. This 
painting by artist Sue Michael pictures a backyard in Booleroo 
Centre, a small Australian town north of Adelaide. Note how 
outside and inside interconnect, a lifeworld feature Michael 
discusses in her essay, p. 15. For panels 1 & 2, see p. 17. 
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the fall 2014 issue has been viewed more than 1,100 
times on the academia.edu website. We are told by 
the Kansas State University webmaster in charge of 
K-Rex (the digital library holding the EAP archive) 
that “hits” to the EAP collection are regularly in the 
top ten percent of most downloaded entries. Phenom-
enological insights may be gaining traction in a way 
unimaginable via paper distribution alone! 
As some readers remember, EAP was originally 
envisioned by philosopher Robert Mugerauer (see 
his essay, p. 9), interior-design educator Margaret 
Boschetti, and environment-behavior researcher Da-
vid Seamon at a breakfast meeting at the 1989 Envi-
ronmental Design Research Association (EDRA) 
conference. Boschetti and Seamon took on the task 
of co-editing EAP until 2002, when Boschetti retired 
and Seamon became editor. Boshetti was unable to 
contribute an essay to mark EAP’s anniversary, but 
she did send a congratulatory note that makes a fit-
ting end to the start of this special issue. She wrote: 
 
David, 
  Congratulations on the 25th anniversary of EAP. 
Hard to believe it has been 25 years since you 
launched this idea and asked me to be involved. It is 
truly a tribute to your commitment to encourage the 
expansion of interest and knowledge in environmen-
tal phenomenology that this milestone has been 
reached. Not only has the publication of EAP sup-
ported scholars, both established and new, to explore 
and expand their research in this field. It also has in-
troduced voices from neighboring disciplines into the 
on-going dialog, thereby enriching the total milieu.   
I clearly recall how important it was to my ca-
reer when I met you at a conference and discovered 
a group of like-minded researchers. Phenomenology 
not only provided a way to investigate questions of 
interest to me. It gave me a home in the academic 
community so I could continue to grow and move for-
ward professionally. In that respect, I am like so 
many others whom you supported via EAP.  
  Best wishes going forward as you continue to 
support young scholars and mature minds with EAP. 
 
Fond regards,  
 
Margaret Boschetti, Hot Springs, Arkansas 
More Donors, 2014 
We gratefully thank the following readers who, since 
the spring 2014 issue, have contributed more than the 
base subscription for 2014: Andrew Cohill, Janet 
Donohoe, Ben Jacks, and Harvey Sherman. 
 
Items of Interest 
The 18th annual meeting of the International Asso-
ciation for Environmental Philosophy (IAEP) will 
be held October 25–27, 2014, in New Orleans. The 
conference follows the annual meetings of the Soci-
ety for Existential and Phenomenological Philos-
ophy (SPEP); and the Society for Phenomenology 
and the Human Sciences (SPHS). http://environmen-
talphilosophy.org/; www.spep.org/; http://sphs.info/. 
 
The 45th annual meeting of the Urban Affairs Asso-
ciation (UAA) will be held in Miami, Florida, April 
8–11, 2015. The theme of the conference is “The Dy-
namics of Place Making in the Global City.” The 
UAA is dedicated to creating interdisciplinary spaces 
for engaging in intellectual and practical discussions 
about urban life. http://urbanaffairsassociation.org/. 
 
The conference, Philosophy of The City II, will be 
held December 4–5, 2014 in Mexico City. Key ques-
tions include: What do philosophers have to say 
about urban life? Is there a need for a new philosophy 
of the city? This conference builds on an earlier con-
ference held in Brooklyn, New York, in 2013. Con-
tact: shane.epting@unt.edu. 
 
The Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology sup-
ports research in aesthetics that draws inspiration 
from the phenomenological tradition. The journal 
provides a platform for innovative ideas that cross 
philosophical traditions and traditionally accepted 
fields of research in aesthetics. www.ingentacon-
nect.com/content/bloomsbury/jap. 
 
ARID: A Journal of Desert Art, Design and Ecology 
is a peer-reviewed annual publication focusing on 
cross-disciplinary explorations of desert arts, design, 
culture and the environment for both scholarly and 
new audiences. ARID seeks submissions related to 
desert regions of the American Southwest and be-
yond. editors@aridjournal.org. 
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Habits and Habituality 
Philosophers Matt Bower and Emanuele Car-
minada have edited a special 2014 issue of Phenom-
enology and Mind, which focuses on “Mind, Habits, 
and Social Reality.” The 14 articles examine “habit, 
especially its personal and interpersonal aspects.” 
Contributors include: Dermot Moran (“The Ego as 
Substrate of Habitualities: Edmund Husserl’s Phe-
nomenology of the Habitual Self”); Maxine Sheets-
Johnson (“On the Origin, Nature, and Genesis of 
Habit”); and Nick Crossley (“The Concept of Habit 
and the Regularities of Social Structure”). The issue 
ends with a bibliography of work relating to habit. 
As a tribute to phenomenology founder Ed-
mund Husserl, we present, in the side bar, right, Mo-
ran’s opening description of Husserl’s understanding 
of habit and habituality. The journal is available at: 
http://www.phenomenologyandmind.eu/. 
 
Max van Manen’s New Book 
 
Max van Manen, 2014. Phenomenology of 
Practice: Meaning-Giving Methods in Phe-
nomenological Research and Writing. Wal-
nut Creek, California: Left Coast Press. 
 
Throughout his academic career, educator Max van 
Manen has been one of the most accessible commen-
tators on phenomenological method. His Research-
ing Human Experience (1990) is one of the most fre-
quently recommended introductions for newcomers 
to phenomenological and hermeneutic research. 
No doubt, Phenomenology of Practice will 
come to hold an equal place because it is a masterly 
account of the nature of phenomenology and the 
lived experience of doing phenomenological re-
search. Van Manen begins by delineating the nature 
of phenomenological investigation broadly and then 
provides a five-chapter overview of key phenomeno-
logical founders and practitioners, including current, 
cutting-edge thinkers like Michel Serres, Jean-Luc 
Nancy, and Jean-Luc Marion. 
In the second, longer portion of the volume, van 
Manen delineates three key aspects of the phenome-
nological process: first, the phenomenological epo-
ché—setting aside assumed points of view and see- 
 
“Life lived ‘with blinders on’…” 
Central to Husserl’s analyses [of habit] is his under-
standing of habitual life in the familiar world. This is 
always a life where meanings are encountered or 
lived through as “always already there” or “pre-
given.” The everyday world of experience has a deep 
degree of stability, commonality, normality, familiar-
ity, and even comfort. It is the common context and 
horizon for our collective concerns…. Precisely be-
cause everyday life has a pre-given, taken-for-
granted character, it is invisible in the analyses of the 
positive sciences. The operations of this hidden inten-
tionality need to be made visible, and Husserl gradu-
ally realized this required a major suspension of our 
naïve worldly-commitment, or belief-in-being. 
 For Husserl, everyday life is natural life, life in 
the natural attitude. This is a life lived in obscurity, 
the unexamined life, life lived according to everyday 
habituality, life lived “with blinders on” as Husserl 
often says. 
 Husserl’s phenomenology of habitual life dis-
covers habit as present at all levels of human behav-
ior from the lower unconscious instincts and drives 
(that have their own peculiar individuality or idiosyn-
crasy) to bodily motility right up to the level of au-
tonomous rational life in culture. Thus he speaks not 
just of bodily habits or traits of character but of pecu-
liar and abiding “habits of thought.” These habits of 
thought include scientific habits of thinking accepted 
without question and that it is the function of the 
transcendental epoché to disrupt and thereby expose. 
 The life of habit… is not just a matter of intellec-
tual attitude or conviction. It can also be a matter of 
perceptual tendencies, desires, feelings, emotions, 
even peculiar moods. Husserl recognizes the complex 
character of our “feelings,” as well as our intertwined 
emotional and affective “states,” acts of empathy, 
sympathy love, fellow feeling, and so on, as well as 
acts of willing (important for our ethical lives). In 
this sense, personal love, for Husserl, is described as 
a “lasting habitus.” All of these can have a habitual 
character, a particular style of being lived through, 
and as a result they can be sedimented into layers that 
encrust the psyche and form the “abiding style of the 
ego” (Dermot Moran, pp. 28–29). 
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ing the phenomenon afresh; second, the phenomeno-
logical reduction—finding ways to locate the essen-
tial qualities of the phenomenon; and, third, phenom-
enological writing—the effort whereby phenome-
nologists transform their sightings and understand-
ings of the phenomenon into accurate, robust de-
scriptions, particularly “the noncognitive, ineffable, 
and pathic aspects of meaning that belong to the phe-
nomenon” (p. 240). The sidebar, below and right, 
presents a short portion of van Manen’s discussion of 
wonder, epoché, and reduction. In a future EAP, we 
hope to include reviews of van Manen's book be-
cause it is a major contribution to phenomenology. 
 
Phenomenology and Wonder 
Phenomenological method is driven by a pathos: 
being swept up in a spell of wonder about phenom-
ena as they appear, show, present, or give them-
selves to us. In the encounter with the things and 
events of the world, phenomenology directs its 
gaze toward the regions where meanings and un-
derstandings originate, well up, and percolate 
through the porous membranes of past sedimenta-
tions—then infuse, permeate, infect, touch, stir us, 
and exercise a formative and affective effect on 
our being…. To say it more pointedly: 
 
 Phenomenological research begins with won-
der at what gives itself and how something 
gives itself. It can only be pursued while sur-
rendering to a state of wonder. 
 A phenomenological question explores what is 
given in moments of prereflective, prepredica-
tive experience—experiences as we live 
through them. 
 Phenomenology aims to grasp the exclusively 
singular aspects (identity/essence/otherness) 
of a phenomenon or event. 
 The epoché (bracketing) and the reduction 
proper are the two most critical components of 
the various forms of the reductions—though 
the reduction itself is understood quite differ-
ently, at times incommensurably, and some-
times contested by various leading philoso-
phers and phenomenologists. 
 
 Phenomenological reduction and analysis oc-
cur primarily in the attitude of the epoché, the 
reduction, and the vocative… (pp. 26–27). 
 
Epoché and Reduction 
How can phenomenology gain access to the prere-
flective experiences as they occur in the taken-for-
granted spheres of our everyday lifeworld? Nor-
mally we rarely reflect on the lived sensibilities of 
our experiences, since we already experience the 
meanings immanent in our everyday practices 
through our bodies, language, habits, things, social 
interactions, and physical environments. 
     Phenomenology is the method to break through 
this taken-for-grantedness and to get to the mean-
ing structures of our experiences. This basic 
method is called the reduction. The reduction con-
sists of two methodical opposing moves that com-
plement each other. Negatively it suspends or re-
moves what obstructs access to the phenome-
non—this move is called the epoché or bracketing. 
And positively it returns, leads back to the mode 
of appearing of the phenomenon—this move is 
called the reduction…. (p. 215). 
 
The epoché describes the ways that we need to 
open ourselves to the world as we experience it 
and free ourselves from presuppositions The re-
duction is generally the methodological term that 
describes the phenomenological gesture that per-
mits us to rediscover what Merleau-Ponty (1962) 
calls “the spontaneous surge of the lifeworld” and 
the way that the phenomena give and show them-
selves in their uniqueness. The aim of the reduc-
tion is to re-achieve a direct and primitive contact 
with the world as we experience it or as it shows 
itself—rather than as we conceptualize it. But we 
need to realize as well that in some sense nothing 
is “simply given.” The phenomenological attitude 
is sustained by wonder, attentiveness, and a desire 
for meaning…. [T]he reduction aims at removing 
any barriers, assumptions, suppositions, projec-
tions, and linguisticalities that prevent the phe-
nomena and events of the lifeworld to appear or 
show themselves as they give themselves. So we 
need to engage in the reduction in order to let that 
which gives itself show itself (p. 220 and p. 221). 
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Twenty-Five Years of EAP 
 
David Seamon, Editor, Environmental and Architectural Phenomenology 
 
he last longer-than-usual issue of EAP was 
produced for its 20th anniversary in 2009. In 
that issue, I published essays by four major 
figures in environmental and architectural 
phenomenology—psychologist Bernd Jager, geogra-
pher Edward Relph, and philosophers Karsten Harries 
and Jeff Malpas. In my introduction [1], I highlighted 
three “recurring concerns” that grounded the aims and 
contents of EAP: 
 
 First, an emphasis on existential phenomenology—in other 
words, the absolute necessity of phenomenological work 
grounded in, arising from, and returning to concrete experi-
ence and the lived reality of lifeworlds; 
 Second, an emphasis on researchers’ openness to the phenom-
enon and offering it a supportive space in which it presents it-
self in a way whereby it is what it is most accurately and com-
prehensively; 
 Third, an effort to hold theory and practice together, since a 
central phenomenological assumption is that how and what 
we understand is how and what we make; therefore, finding 
more accurate ways to see, think, and envision should, in turn, 
strengthen design, planning, policy, and advocacy. 
   
These concerns remain central to the aims of EAP, 
and I don’t wish to discuss them again here. Rather, 
in this introduction to the special 25th-anniversary is-
sue, I, first, explain how its format came into being; 
and, second, discuss the one theme that has struck me 
most strongly in editing this special issue—i.e., the 
question of how we accurately understand, describe, 
envision, plan, and design for a central phenomeno-
logical claim: that human beings are always already 
inescapably immersed and entwined in their worlds 
that, most of the time, “just happen” without the in-
tervention of anything or anyone. 
 
s I considered scenarios for a special anniver-
sary issue, I decided that the most revealing 
possibility might be to invite a good number 
of individuals associated with “environmental and ar-
chitectural phenomenology” to contribute a short es-
say of 500–2,500 words. I sent out some 60 invitations 
and eventually received the 19 essays published here. In 
my letter of invitation, I explained that my aim was to 
“produce a special fall issue marking a quarter century 
of phenomenological work relating to environmental 
and architectural concerns.” I included a list of possible 
questions that contributors might wish to address (the 
list follows this introduction on p. 8). I emphasized, 
however, that, “if there are some other relevant ques-
tions or themes more important to you currently, then 
please focus on those.” 
 In studying the 19 essays, one notes that most con-
tributors did not respond to my questions directly but, 
instead, focused on other themes and situations, all of 
which still relate to EAP and indicate important direc-
tions that future work in environmental and architec-
tural phenomenology might take. Robert Mugerauer’s 
opening essay is a helpful historical overview of “envi-
ronmental and architectural phenomenology,” particu-
larly its disciplinary and professional dimensions. 
In pondering the arrangement of the other 18 es-
says, I decided to organize them thematically. The first 
five essays—by psychologist Eva-Maria Simms, artist 
Sue Michael, and philosophers Jeff Malpas, Bruce 
Janz, and Dennis Skocz—deal in various ways with the 
theme of place—why it is important phenomenologi-
cally; how it might be understood via real-world situa-
tions; how human attachment to place might be intensi-
fied; and how physical, environmental, and human 
qualities contribute to a sense of place. 
The next five essays—by anthropologist Tim In-
gold, ecologist Mark Riegner, environmental educator 
John Cameron, and philosophers Janet Donohoe and 
Bryan Bannon—shift focus toward the lived constitu-
tion of nature, the natural environment, and the natural 
world. A central concern is how, conceptually and prac-
tically, we replace the standard modernist division be-
tween people and world with a penetrating recognition 
that human-being-in-the world always involves aspects 









to how this lived immersion is to be understood con-
ceptually or to be encountered experientially. 
The next three essays—by architectural theorist 
Lena Hopsch, philosopher Matthew S. Bower, and 
educator Paul Krafel—shift attention toward real-
world “applications” of phenomenological principles 
and methods—Hopsch, in terms of transit design; 
Bower, in terms of lived implications of virtual reali-
ties; and Krafel, in terms of a more engaged, animated 
pedagogy, including  environmental education. 
The last five essays highlight broader conceptual 
issues such as the subjectivity-objectivity dilemma 
(geographer Yi-Fu Tuan); the appropriate relation-
ship between phenomenology and analytic, empirical 
science (architect Julio Bermudez); phenomenology 
as practiced by non-phenomenologists (geographer 
Edward Relph); the relationship between phenome-
nological understanding and practical application 
(philosopher Ingrid Stefanovic); and parallels be-
tween real-world and phenomenological pathways 
and journeys (phenomenologist Betsy Behnke). 
It is particularly appropriate that this special EAP 
issue ends with Behnke’s essay, since her invaluable 
Study Project in Phenomenology of the Body Newslet-
ter, published from 1988 to 1994, was one of the orig-
inal inspirations for EAP. In that sense, endings often 
resonate with starting points. 
 
n studying the 19 essays that follow, one can lo-
cate a considerable range of related themes, but I 
want to focus on one that lately has returned again 
and again to my thinking and writing: the difficult 
business of understanding the complex, multivalent 
ways in which we, as human beings, are intertwined, 
intermeshed, entrenched and submerged in the worlds 
in which we find ourselves. 
Different phenomenologists have sought to clar-
ify this “lived immersion” variously, with Husserl 
emphasizing intentionality, lifeworld, and natural at-
titude; Heidegger, being-in-world and dwelling; and 
Merleau-Ponty, lived embodiment, chiasm, and flesh. 
In his essay, Relph reminds us of yet another im-
portant effort to phrase this lived immersion: French 
historian Eric Dardel’s perspicacious notion of geo-
graphicality—“the relationships and experiences that 
bind human beings to the earth, which [Dardel] con-
sidered to be fundamental aspects of human exist-
ence.” Relph quotes Dardel’s striking claim that geo-
graphicality “is not to be looked at but is, rather, an in-
sertion of people into the world….”  
 Several contributors to this special issue consider 
how this people-world interlock might be phrased con-
ceptually. Most directly concerned with this matter is 
Malpas, who speaks of “human being as placed being” 
and goes so far as to suggest that, because human beings 
are always already emplaced, phenomenology might 
consider rebranding itself as topology, since “every ap-
pearing or presencing is itself a ‘taking place’.” 
In different ways, Donohoe and Ingold make a sim-
ilar point in relation to the constitution of nature as it is 
lived. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty, Donohoe views na-
ture “not as a thing but as a ground of experience it-
self”—a “world of which we are always already aware.” 
Ingold argues that, in speaking of a phenomenology of 
the natural world, we conceptually presuppose an artifi-
cial division—a separating betweenness—whereby we 
fail “to notice how both we and [the beings and things 
of nature] go along together in the current of time.” 
How, he asks, do we really understand and foster a “to-
gethering” rather than yet another “othering”? 
An answer to this question is suggested by other 
contributors, though in contrasting ways. For Simms, 
Michael, and Cameron, a lived enjoinment with place 
entails prolonged, care-grounded engagement, a way of 
being with the world that Riegner also points to in his 
overview of Goethean science as a sensitive phenome-
nology of nature. Though he would probably not use In-
gold’s phrasing, Malpas finds this “togethering” in the 
intimate, inseparable “gathering” of people-in-place. As 
he has written so eloquently elsewhere, place is “consti-
tuted through a gathering of elements that are them-
selves mutually defined only through the way in which 
they are gathered together within the place they also 
constitute” [2].  
 In considerable contrast, Bannon argues that most 
current phenomenologies of human-being-in-the-world 
remain caught up in a modernist “subject-object meta-
physics.” He suggests that we must move away from 
any claims of some essential, always-present lived 
structure of people-world. Instead, he emphasizes that 
we consider “decentering the human” and recognizing 
how ecological systems are always in continual flux. 
Bannon intimates that the conventional phenomenolog-
ical emphasis on order, unity, synthesis, generalization, 
I 
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and truth needs reconsideration via more recent post-
structuralist, relationalist, and materialist perspectives 
that favor indeterminacy, diversity, local narratives, 
particularity, and contingent possibilities. 
 
or me personally, the entry most intriguing is 
Matthew Bower’s discussion of virtual reality, 
which he sees as progressively “part and parcel 
of the naïve everydayness of life” and entering “into 
relation with all other nodes of our perceptual field, 
modifying the nature of the whole.” 
As some EAP readers no doubt know, virtual re-
ality (VR) has recently made a quantum leap via 22-
year-old inventor Palmer Lucky’s headset device 
called the Oculus Rift, bought by Facebook in March, 
2014, for two billion dollars. This digital machine is 
the first to generate fully what VR programmers call 
presence—a deep, unquestioned sense one is some-
where else, for example, a simulation of a craggy, 
rocky mountainside that seems so real that you really 
think you could fall into the deep chasm below [3]. 
 On one hand, Bower’s claims for the future of VR 
are hopeful in that “we can find a virtuality that is not 
set over and against the real” but extends reality and 
enhances virtually what reality was before VR. On the 
other hand, there is the phenomenological work of 
philosopher Albert Borgmann, who is less sanguine 
because of the lived ways that virtual reality can facil-
itate experiences that might seem real but could never 
fully unfold in real reality or actual lifeworlds [4]. 
Borgmann identifies four lived qualities that trigger 
enhancements, distortions, or reductions of what “ex-
perience” often becomes in virtual reality: 
  
 Pliability: the way that virtual objects and experiences can 
be “entirely subject[ed] to…desire and manipulation” [5]; 
 Discontinuity: the way that virtual objects and experiences 
need not have any practical connection or lived relationship 
with the real-world situation in the midst of which the virtual 
user is still immersed even as he partakes in virtual reality; 
 Brilliance: The way that virtual reality can intensify an ex-
perience’s attractive features and reduce or eliminate en-
tirely its unpleasant, uninteresting, or irrelevant dimensions; 
the “truly brilliant reality,” writes Borghman, “would ex-
clude all unwanted information” [6]; 
 Disposability: The way that virtual users can end the virtual 
experience at any time and feel no responsibility or obliga-
tion to the “events” and “experiences” of the virtual reality 
they have just left; in this sense, virtual reality is readily dis-
missible and disposable.  
Underlying these four qualities of virtual experi-
ence is the more fundamental phenomenological recog-
nition that “Reality encumbers and confines” [7]. 
Though VR may superficially seem real, it can readily 
escape and replace the lived messiness of real lifeworlds 
with much more convenient, vivid, or fantastical situa-
tions that require no stakes or responsibilities. 
On one hand, virtual reality holds remarkable 
promise in that it could be a huge contributor to repair-
ing a good number of the world’s problems. Who, for 
example, would need a car if he could simply put on his 
virtual headset and “go to” his workplace, grocery store, 
or favorite recreation place? Or who needs an elaborate 
house (or vacation, hobby, or fun night out) when all 
these “experiences” and “places” might be less costly 
generated vicariously and virtually? 
On the other hand, virtual reality involves potential 
risks and dangers, including time wasting, titillation, ad-
diction, and withdrawal from most things real. Why 
make the efforts that an encumbering, confining real 
world entails when virtual reality can provide ease, 
pleasure, and enhanced vividness without the downside 
of demands, exertions, obligations, or consequences? 
I highlight virtual reality because, as Borgmann and 
Bower’s work indicates, phenomenological perspec-
tives can offer singular insights as to VR’s possibilities 
and implications. Lifeworld, natural attitude, intention-
ality, horizon, body-subject, embodied emplacement, 
lived place, and other key phenomenological notions all 
identify integral constituents of any human experience, 
whether real or virtual. Human beings are always al-
ready soldered in and to their worlds, even if the solder-
ing may be virtual. Understanding this soldering, in its 
myriad lived aspects, remains a central aim of EAP and 
environmental and architectural phenomenology. 
 
Notes 
1. D. Seamon, Twenty Years of EAP, Environmental and Architec-
tural Phenomenology 20, 3 (fall 2009): 3–5. 
2. J. Malpas, Heidegger's Topology, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006, p. 
29. 
3. L. Grossman, Head Trip, Time Magazine, Apr. 7, 2014, pp. 36–41; 
P. Rubin, Oculus Rift, Wired, June, 2014, pp. 78–95. 
4. A. Borgmann, Crossing the Postmodern Divide, Chicago: Univ. 
of Chicago Press, 1992, pp. 87–102; also see A. Borgmann, 
Holding on to Reality, Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1999. 
5. Borgmann, Crossing, p. 88. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Ibid., p. 96.
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Possible Questions for the 25th - Anniversary Issue of EAP  (see p. 5) 
 
Questions relating to phenomenology 
and related interpretive approaches 
and methods: 
 What is phenomenology and what does 
it offer to whom?  
 What is the state of phenomenological 
research today? What are your hopes 
and concerns regarding phenomenol-
ogy? 
 Does phenomenology continue to have 
relevance in examining human experi-
ence in relation to world? 
 Are there various conceptual and meth-
odological modes of phenomenology 
and, if so, how can they be categorized 
and described? 
 Has phenomenological research been 
superseded by other conceptual ap-
proaches—e.g., post-structuralism, so-
cial-constructionism, relationalist and 
non-representational perspectives, the 
various conceptual “turns,” and so 
forth? 
 Can phenomenology contribute to mak-
ing a better world? If so, what are the 
most crucial phenomena and topics to 
be explored phenomenologically? 
 Can phenomenological research offer 
practical results in terms of design, 
planning, policy, and advocacy? 
 How might phenomenological insights 
be broadcast in non-typical academic 
ways—e.g., through artistic expression, 
theatrical presentation, digital evoca-
tion, virtual realities, and so forth? 
 What are the most important aims for 
future phenomenological research? 
 Do the various post-structural and so-
cial-constructionist criticisms of phe-
nomenology—that it is essentialist, 
masculinist, authoritative, voluntarist, 
ignorant of power structures, and so 
forth—point toward its demise? 
 
Questions relating to the natural 
world and environmental and ecologi-
cal concerns: 
 Can there be a phenomenology of na-
ture and the natural world? 
 What can phenomenology offer the in-
tensifying environmental and ecological 
crises we face today? 
 Can phenomenology contribute to more 
sustainable actions and worlds? 
 Can one speak of a sustainable life-
world? 
 What is a phenomenology of a lived en-
vironmental ethic and who are the key 
contributors? 
 Do the “sacred” and the “holy” have a 
role in caring for the natural world? For 
places? For lifeworlds broadly? 
 Can phenomenology contribute to envi-
ronmental education? If so, in what 
ways? 
 Can there be a phenomenology of the 
two laws of thermodynamics, especially 
the second law claiming that all activi-
ties, left to their own devices, tend to-
ward greater disorder and fewer possi-
bilities? Are there ways whereby phe-
nomenological understanding of life-
world might help to reduce the acceler-
ating disordering of natural and human 
worlds? 
 
Questions relating to place, place ex-
perience, and place meaning: 
 Why has the topic of place become an 
important phenomenological topic? 
 Can a phenomenological understanding 
of place contribute to better place mak-
ing? 
 Can phenomenology contribute to a 
generative understanding of place and 
place making? 
 What roles do bodily regularity and ha-
bitual inertia play in the constitution of 
place and place experience? 
 What are the lived relationships be-
tween place, sustainability, and a re-
sponsive environmental ethic? 
 How are phenomenological accounts to 
respond to post-structural interpreta-
tions of space and place as rhizomic and 
a “meshwork of paths” (Ingold)? 
 Can phenomenological accounts incor-
porate a “progressive sense of place” 
argued for by critical theorists like 
Doreen Massey? 
 Can phenomenological explications of 
space and place account for human dif-
ferences—gender, sexuality, less-
abledness, social class, cultural back-
ground, and so forth? 
 Can phenomenology contribute to the 
politics and ideology of place? 
 Can a phenomenological understanding 
of lived embodiment and habitual iner-
tia be drawn upon to facilitate robust 
places and to generate mutual support 
and understanding among places, espe-
cially places that are considerably dif-
ferent (e.g., different ethnic neighbor-
hoods or regions)? 
 Can phenomenology contribute to mo-
bility, the nature of “flows,” rhizomic 
spaces, the places of mobility, non-
spaces and their relationship to mobility 
and movement? 
 
Questions relating to architecture and 
environmental design and policy: 
 Can there be a phenomenology of archi-
tecture and architectural experience and 
meaning? 
 Can phenomenology contribute to bet-
ter architectural design? 
 How do qualities of the designable 
world—spatiality, materiality, lived 
aesthetics, environmental embodiment 
etc.—contribute to lifeworlds? 
 What are the most pertinent environ-
mental and architectural features con-
tributing to a lifeworld’s being one way 
rather than another? 
 What role will cyberspace and digital 
technologies have in 21st-century life-
worlds? How will they play a role in 
shaping designed environments, partic-
ularly architecture? 
 What impact will digital advances and 
virtual realities have on physical em-
bodiment, architectural design, and 
real-world places? Will virtual reality 
eventually be able to simulate “real re-
ality” entirely? If so, how does such a 
development transform the nature of 
lifeworld, natural attitude, place, and ar-
chitecture? 
 Can virtual worlds become so “real” 
that they are lived as “real” worlds? 
 
Other potential questions: 
 What is the lived relationship between 
people and the worlds in which they 
find themselves? 
 Can lifeworlds be made to happen self-
consciously? If so, how? Through what 
individual efforts? Through what group 
efforts? 
 Can a phenomenological education in 
lifeworld, place, and environmental em-
bodiment assist citizens and profession-
als in better understand the workings 
and needs of real-world places and 
thereby contribute to their envisioning 
and making? 
 Is it possible to speak of human-rights-
in-place or place justice? If so, would 
such a possibility move attention and 
supportive efforts toward improving the 
places in which people and other living 
beings find themselves, rather than fo-
cusing only on the rights and needs of 
individuals and groups without consid-
eration of their place context? 
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AP is celebrating its 25th year of successfully 
accomplishing a central task: working as a 
site for phenomenologically exploring our 
lifeworld. In doing so, it has exemplified the 
core dimensions of both the phenomena and the ap-
proach: focusing on our lives together in our environ-
mental and architectural realms and on the ways we 
come to understanding as part of a social, communal 
project. EAP has insightfully shown us what is given 
but too often overlooked because we are caught up in 
the midst of what we are doing. Lifeworld meanings, 
in other words, are normally experienced implicitly 
and not unfolded explicitly. 
As a result of attending to EAP’s gift—evoking 
meanings and values that enrich our lives—many of 
us, whether specifically working phenomenologically 
or with related qualitative strategies, have found our-
selves called to participate in dialogue and to respond 
with research, design, and education. 
What strikes me most in looking back over past 
EAP issues is the atmosphere of openness and freedom 
that prevails in the course of presenting fresh insights 
and substantive content. The project never was to form 
a closed circle of researchers, professionals, or inquis-
itive readers. Rather, a better image might be genu-
inely international networks with many different sorts 
of linkages among members or of orbiting activities 
intersecting here and there. That is to say, EAP is all 
about people with a certain attitude or style as much 
as it is about the environmental and architectural sub-
ject matter. David Seamon and Margaret Boschetti de-
serve full credit for helping so many of us along the 
journey. 
 
hink of how the story of the last 25 years is a 
gathering and scattering of participants who do 
not form anything like a movement but, rather, 
facilitate a series of movable rendezvous. Indeed, part 
of the richness of what has happened is that many par-
ticular “tribes” actually have little contact with each 
other, or have in common a few individuals who are 
related with what are known as weak rather than strong 
ties. 
In the beginning, there were “humanistic” geog-
raphers attending to place: Yi-Fu Tuan, Anne 
Buttimer, Ted Relph, and a young David Seamon.  A 
few theorists and philosophers such as Christian Nor-
berg-Schulz, Karsten Harries, and a young Bob 
Mugerauer were attending to architecture. These 
thinkers, however, were not connected at first. For ex-
ample, I was happy but embarrassed to learn at a 1983 
Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philoso-
phy conference in St. Louis that Harries, beyond his 
general work in aesthetics, had developed a sub-spe-
cialty of Rococo churches. 
So off went the venture into uncharted territory. 
Not surprisingly—though pleasantly surprising to us 
in each instance—we did not “discover” other people, 
since they were already there doing good work. But we 
did discover what they were doing and ways to con-
nect more and more of us. The basic move was to find 
venues for getting together, the master of which was 
Seamon, already performing the role he still does, for-
malized in EAP. 
 
he main problem was finding parent organiza-
tions whose conferences were not so overly 










Most of these venues were disciplinary, but an increas-
ing number of multi-disciplinary, environmentally or 
architecturally focused organizations also appeared. 
There were sessions for several years at the American 
Association of Geographers (AAG), especially in the 
1980s. There was also teasing open a time and place 
as part of the Society for Phenomenology and the Hu-
man Sciences (SPHS) meetings, beginning in the early 
1980s and still continuing, as well as the hospitable In-
ternational Human Science Research Conference 
(IHSRC). 
Somewhat more problematic (because in the heart 
of the beast), there have been a long series of presen-
tations at the Environmental Design Research Associ-
ation (EDRA) from the mid-1980s. EDRA still pro-
vides a venue today, though some of us no longer at-
tend because, in many ways, a hackneyed positivist 
critique still dominates (EDRA was where I first met 
Ingrid Stefanovic and where the intrepid Seamon still 
carries on). The International Association of Person-
Environment Studies (IAPS), the European counter-
part to EDRA (and more receptive to phenomenology 
with colleagues such as Gilles Barbey) was a good 
venue in the mid-1980s and following. 
Architectural, urban, and design-oriented work 
was regularly presented at the Association of Colle-
giate Schools of Architecture (ACSA) conferences 
from the mid-1980s onward and less often at the meet-
ings of the Association of Collegiate Schools of Plan-
ning (ACSP).  Meanwhile, the blossoming field of ar-
chitectural anthropology was hospitable as seen in 
presentations at the Built Form and Culture confer-
ences in the 1980s and the International Association 
for the Study of Traditional Environments (IASTE) 
from 1990 to the present. 
Philosophers independently carried on, in large 
part because of the growing interest in environmental 
issues and regular presentations at the philosophical 
“mother ship” of SPEP in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. In the early 2000s, another sub-set of continen-
tally-oriented researchers founded the International 
Association for Environmental Philosophy (IAEP), 
which continues to hold its meetings in conjunction 
with SPEP and SPHS. 
Many phenomenologists, purged from philosophy 
departments by analytic philosophy in the 1970s, had 
found other arenas in which to operate, including com-
parative literature. The International Association for 
Philosophy and Literature (IAPL) has been a two-dec-
ades-long site of exchange since the 1990s. Finally, 
there have been many “one of a kind” meetings focus-
ing on topics such as place, spirituality, technology, 
sustainability, ecology, landscape, regional studies, 
and urbanism. 
 
s I noted earlier, what is especially striking is 
that, while there are some people active in 
multiple arenas, almost no one participates in 
all. Indeed, even in the complex networks elaborated 
in the various conferences and meetings, not everyone 
crossed paths. There are many individuals and clusters 
with distinct trajectories, aware of each other but not 
focally working together. To note just a few, and here 
necessarily leave many others out (the remedy for 
which is the terrific now-digital EAP archive!) I still 
have not met face to face with Jeff Malpas, Michael 
Jackson, or James Weiner, have only intersected once 
with Dalibor Vesely, though with Juhani Pallasmaa 
and Alberto Pérez-Gómez more often, and with Tim 
Ingold only last year. 
My point in all this attention to meetings is that 
environmental and architectural phenomenology is as-
sociated with a diverse, only loosely connected, group 
of interesting people. One result is a richness that 
comes from diversity and occasional cross-fertiliza-
tion. That is the real story. Yes, content matters, but it 
proceeds from looking, thinking, and talking together 
about our shared world. While new people continu-
ously have found one or another via ongoing activities 
and publications, what would have been much more 
random with many missed connections has been fo-
cused and facilitated by EAP. 
It is not too much to say that the welcoming atti-
tude prevailing among the people involved and prom-















Malpas is Distinguished Professor at the University of Tasmania where he works across programs in Architec-
ture, Geography, and Philosophy. Two of his most recent volumes are Heidegger and the Thinking of Place (MIT 
Press, 2012); and the edited collection, The Place of Landscape (MIT Press, 2011). Jeff.Malpas@utas.edu.au. 
© 2014 Jeff Malpas.
 
 
lthough I am certainly not opposed to a 
phenomenological characterization, I think 
of my own work as, for the most part, “top-
ological” or “topographical” rather than 
“phenomenological.” Yet I also take phenomenology, 
along with hermeneutics, to be essentially topological 
in character, a point I have argued for elsewhere (e.g., 
Place and Experience, 1999). It is precisely this topo-
logical character that seems to me to underpin the con-
nections between architecture, environment, and phe-
nomenology that EAP has been concerned to explore 
and articulate over the past 25 years. 
One problem with some contemporary phenome-
nology, however, is that it seems to lose sight of this 
topological orientation (and so also to lose sight of its 
properly transcendental character). In fact, the contin-
uing contemporary significance of phenomenology 
seems to me to reside neither in its cognitive scientific 
relevance nor in its possible connection with aspects 
of analytic thought, but rather in the way that issues of 
place and environment arise as central to phenomeno-
logical inquiry, even if they are sometimes obscured 
within it. This is also why phenomenology remains 
important to my own work, in spite of my ambivalence 
about whether that work is itself to be understood as 
primarily phenomenological in character. 
 
f phenomenology is described as that mode of 
philosophical inquiry directed primarily at an un-
derstanding of “phenomena”—at an understand-
ing of “what appears” or “is present”—then its topo-
logical orientation is already evident in the fact that 
every appearing or presencing is itself a “taking 
place.” It is this “taking place,” which is bounded as 
well as open and dynamic, that grounds the idea of to-
pology as philosophical. Such “taking place” is the 
proper topos of the phenomena—the topos of appear-
ing or presencing. 
The significance of such a topos is not affected by 
shifts in the character of place and space that suppos-
edly characterize contemporary globalized modernity. 
We can say that even globalized modernity appears 
only in and through specific topoi—globalization is 
something that occurs only in and through particular 
places, in respect of specific things, localities, and 
practices. Understanding globalization thus requires 
an understanding of place—and this is all the more so, 
given the way in which one of the characteristic fea-
tures of globalization (and of technological modernity 
more generally) is to obscure its own placed character. 
In this respect, too much of the contemporary dis-
course around globalization and modernity, even sup-
posedly “critical” discourse, fails to engage with the 
real character of modernity, since the conceptual 
framework it employs (typically that of unbounded 
flow and connection) is precisely the framework of 
modernity's own self-representation—and so also the 
self-representation of contemporary corporate capital-
ism and bureaucratic-technocratic governance. 
 
he topos of the phenomena is a topos in which 
we are always involved. As such, the inquiry 
into topos, the turn back to place, is also a turn 
back to ourselves. It is, I would say, a turn back to the 
human (although a turn that also puts the human in 
question—puts ourselves in question). The mode of 
being that is the human is most succinctly character-
ized as that mode of being that is always turned toward 
topos—even when it seems to be turned away. 
Human being is thus placed being. This is espe-
cially important both for architectural and environ-











place and the embeddedness of place in us that under-
pins and ought to guide environmental care and con-
cern as well as architectural design and practice. 
Greater environmental attentiveness is likely to be 
achieved only through greater attentiveness to our own 
human being—which here means our being in and 
through place—and the same holds for good architec-
tural and design practice (which is also why so much 
contemporary architecture falls short as architecture). 
Moreover, in emphasizing the environmental here as 
tied to place, what is also emphasized is a conception 
of the environmental that itself encompasses the archi-
tectural (as the architectural itself overlaps with the en-
vironmental). 
On such a topological or topographic conception, 
the environmental is not merely that which pertains to 
the “natural” or the “unbuilt” (to that which is other 
than the human), nor is the architectural about only the 
“cultural” or the “built,” but instead both refer us to 
the entirety of the surrounding world as it is brought to 
focus in place, and that therefore includes the built and 
the unbuilt, the cultural and the natural, the urban and 
the wild. 
In this way, the genuinely interconnected and in-
terdependent character of the world is brought into fo-
cus as an interconnectedness and interdependence that 
is both encompassing and yet also concentrated; that 
is complex and multiple and yet comes to salience in 
the singularity of place. 
 
ecognizing the topological character of phe-
nomenology means recognizing its environ-
mental and architectural relevance, and yet this 
may also be thought to bring with it a need to rethink 
the character of phenomenology. Although it does not 
do away with phenomenology as a mode of philosoph-
ical analysis and description, it suggests that phenom-
enology has an additional task that is directed toward 
the uncovering and articulation of our everyday in-
volvement in the world, as that involvement occurs in 
and through the places in which our lives are embed-
ded, and as it brings those places, and the wider envi-
ronmental context, with all its complexities and inter-
dependencies, to light. 
Such a task requires a mode of phenomenology 
that speaks to the phenomena in their immediacy, their 
singularity—and in their everydayness. Such a phe-
nomenology would be a phenomenology of the every-
day, but also a phenomenology attuned to the place of 
the everyday and the everydayness of place. To some 
extent, it is a phenomenology already present, though 
less in the pages of Husserl and Heidegger than in the 
articulation of the placed character of experience that 
is to be found in much contemporary architecture, art, 
music, film and literature, as well as in many forms of 
personal reflection and practice. 
Perhaps the turn toward a more explicitly topolog-
ical sensibility, even in conjunction with phenomenol-
ogy, also requires a turn toward a closer engagement 
with ordinary life as well as popular culture—to an un-
derstanding of topos in its most prosaic forms as that 
out of which any more developed engagement, includ-
ing with environmental questions, must arise. 
 
his understanding of phenomenology is also 
one that brings with it a fundamental concern 
with the ethical—where ethics is itself already 
oriented toward the question of our placed being in the 
world. Here place brings together the ethical with the 
ontological, so that the two are seen as properly and 
inextricably bound together. 
Our being placed does not merely determine our 
being, it is our being, and as such it is also that which 
is the foundation for our being as ethical—it is in be-
ing placed that we are given over to the question of our 
proper relation to ourselves, to others, and to the 
world. 
It is thus that environmental concern, as a concern 
with the world and our relation to it as that is articu-
lated in and through place and places, itself arises as a 
concern that is both ethical and ontological. Such a 
concern has been clearly evident through the pages of 
EAP. Thanks, as well as congratulations to David Sea-
mon and to EAP on 25 years of sustained engagement 
with the issues at stake here—25 years of sustained en-
gagement with phenomenology, with environment, 
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rom ten until I was twenty-eight years old, I 
spent none of my birthdays at home. August 
was always the time for travel: my tenth birth-
day, in a tent at a girl scout summer camp; my 
eleventh, in a convalescent home; my thirteenth, free 
and unsupervised in Salzburg; my fifteenth, accompa-
nying an elderly great aunt to Wales; my seventeenth, 
as a maid in a dilapidated hotel on a North Sea island; 
my eighteenth, in London; my nineteenth, in Prague; 
my twentieth, high up in the Alps; my twenty-first, a 
Sunday a few days after arriving as a graduate student 
in Dallas, Texas; my twenty-second, at a wedding in 
Paolo Alto; and so on. 
I left my home in Germany to have my American 
adventure—without knowing I would never return to 
live in Germany, apart from visiting my parents a few 
weeks most summers. When I was a young woman, it 
seemed to be a sign of my destiny that I awoke on that 
special day every year in another place, with other peo-
ple, and without a birthday party. It made Salzburg, 
London, and Prague special. To touch the hearts of 
those places, I made sure I took my solitary “birthday 
walk” on beaches or through 
the mazes of city streets.  
My husband Michael 
and I moved to a house on 
Mt. Washington after we 
came to Pittsburgh. “We 
have travelled far on this 
mountain,” he wrote in a 
poem for me after our son 
was born. Over the past 25 
years, that line has captured 
for me a different way of 
travelling. We have lived on 
the same mountain since 
1987. We have walked the same streets, have seen 
children grow up, witnessed funeral processions, saw 
old houses fall and new ones built, and have looked 
out over the Monongahela Valley too many times to 
count. 
 
 still travel to Europe every year, but the direction 
of my journey has gradually changed. It all began 
with birds. Our back porch had a canvas awning 
pulled up in winter, and every spring a pair of rosy 
house finches nested in the folds. A pair of mourning 
doves has been recycling a nest on the ledge above our 
back door for more than a decade, and they are proba-
bly by now the offspring of the offspring. I have to 
make sure every year that we do not use the porch too 
early in the season because, as soon as the door opens, 
the mama bird goes whoosh and flies away in panic. 
Every year the same visitors: They come and stay for 
a few weeks, their babies fledge, and they move on to 
other places when the season ends. 
Birds, I noticed, don’t just fly around all the time. 
They make their home in one place, and they live there 
for the season, just like we 
do. They share this place 
above the Monongahela 
River with us. They are our 
neighbors, which means 
that they are our nah-gibur 
(Old High German), our 
“near-dwellers.” 
I began to notice other 
birds returning over the 
years: the chimney swifts 
who come in May; the 
magnolia warblers, who 










same time; the scarlet tanagers, who flash through the 
woods in June. Early May is the best time, because, 
through the still sparse leaves, you can see the ruby 
crowned kinglets in the thickets. My favorite neigh-
bors, the coopers’ hawks, refurbish their nest and en-
gage in their courtship dance. 
 
y daily walks through the neighborhood 
streets and woods are now overlaid with a 
soundscape of birdsong. I slowly learned to 
notice and differentiate the territorial melody of the 
wood thrushes or the warning chips of the chickadees. 
They don’t seem to mind me—I guess I am nothing 
compared to a feral cat or a red-tailed hawk. Slowly, 
year after year, I have come to “travel far on this 
mountain,” which has become more varied and full. 
My travels do not go far away anymore, but they go 
deep. 
Going deep in a place means to understand its 
rhythms and its web of beings: the change of light over 
the rivers at dawn, the migration of birds, the first toad 
lilies of the spring, the ebb and flow of human and non-
human beings who are my neighbors. I imagine that 
women in hunter-gatherer societies had deep relation-
ships with their places, and they cultivated a particular 
knowledge of life in one place. That knowledge was 
inscribed into their bones: the legs that walked and the 
hands that touched. Their ears understood the cries of 
animals; their eyes knew how to see; their hearts wel-
comed the turning of the seasons, even if they were 
cold, wet, and uncomfortable. 
As to the stones under us—the bones of the 
earth—how rarely do we actually see them here in 
Western Pennsylvania! They are hidden under layers 
of leaf mold and concrete, but sometimes you find a 
clearing in the woods where the beautiful red sand-
stone juts from a cliff. Or one notices shiny jet coal 
pieces sometimes flung across old trails. The story is 
that, during the great depression, people would gather 
these coal fragments and burn them in their stoves. 
Going deep means to look at the stone and ask: 
What is under there? How did it come about? How 
strange to notice that all our hills have the same height! 
But you learn they are not hills at all: In this part of 
Pennsylvania, there are only valleys carved from a 
plateau by glacial-melt water during the last ice ages. 
 
rue ecological awareness means to go deep in a 
natural place. You begin to understand its fab-
ric or relationships and how it changes in time. 
You remember the animal fellows from years back, 
and you look forward to their return and the birth of 
their babies. 
You care for this place because you have walked 
it, and it lives in your muscles and bones. You care for 
this place because you have seen and scented and 
heard it. This place lives in your senses as a differen-
tiated, perceptual landscape. It lives in your memory 
and it lives in your thinking because it asks you ques-
tions, and you search for answers. 
This place lives in your dreams as the landscape 
of your soul, and you are here to be its witness. Your 
breath is of it and in you, and you give it back. After 
the last, your body will be of it, and your soul will pour 
itself over the river valleys. You are finally able to read 
the braille of the air currents as they carry other winged 
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ustralian historian and writer Paul Carter 
(2010) has explored the spatial history of 
Australia and has provided pathways for 
me, as an artist, to follow: to meshes of lo-
cal complexity, the clearly invisible, the breached 
commonplace, and story lines that can be traced back 
to unheard voices. Carter offers an approach that re-
mains open to negotiation, where the human, non-hu-
man, cosmic, and local are all together. 
Local South Australian knowledge, now gone, 
was collected by Robert Bruce in his 1902 Reminis-
cences of an Old Squatter [1]. He wrote: 
 
I used to wonder why those rodents [“suahs,” or stick-nest rats] 
would heap up a big cartload of sticks in the shape of a haycock, 
to roof their nests, when a half a barrowful might have fully met 
all requirements… those little chaps always had plenty of com-
pany, for whenever I happened to drop a lighted match on the 
windward side of their woodheaps I always noticed that in a short 
time afterwards a pretty equally mixed assemblage of suahs and 
snakes would leave…Those suahs have long since  disappeared 
from the South Australian settled country (quoted in Barker et al. 
1995). 
 
The stick-nest rat’s generous domestic practices, 
sharing with other species in an arid climate, have per-
meated my thoughts as a topos, a schema, particularly 
in relation to Mid North snakes’ poisonous venom. 
The northern reaches of South Australia’s Mid North 
have different geographical conditions from the more 
popular local tourist destinations of the Barossa, Clare 
Valley, and the Flinders Ranges.  Long lines of an-
cient hills run north to south, sheltering flat plains that 
are usually tinder dry in summer. Peppermint box 
gums used to cover the undulating land, but these trees 
have given way to pastoral leases. 
There is very little surface water, and the unpredict-
able climate brings flash floods, bushfires, snow, fierce 
wind, low winter temperatures, and unspeakable sum-
mer heat where snow may have rested a few months be-
fore. Drought is a major shaping force, and the land-
scape is dotted with old bores and homestead ruins that 
tell of the geographical realities (Williams 1974; 
Meinig 1963). 
First-nation culture suggests the local landscape 
was generous, and the native Ngadjuri people lived suc-
cessfully in the region before battles over water and land 
access began with European pastoralists (Warrior 
2005). The Ngadjuri barely survived, after a late nine-
teenth-century decimation of their numbers and culture 
through massacres, disease, and displacement. Their 
strong ties to the land, incorporating cosmology, lan-
guage, and knowledge of local medicinal plants, have 
mostly been lost. 
 
y European pioneering ancestors had strong 
ties to local Ngadjuri, and I believe my fam-
ily quickly learned to love the region as the 
Ngadjuri did. The sanctity of all life and the skills to 
make do with what resources were available to adapt to 
a harsh life are foundations for my family’s culture, and 
I feel this directly links to Mid North geographical in-
fluences. A spiritual dimension runs through my visual-
art research and becomes clearer after each visit to the 
area as I learn to interpret perceived yet unseen forces—











gence, which has left 
traces wherever I go.  
If life was difficult 
in this region, there still 
seems to be a bias for 
life and successful 
place making. It is a 
personal journey I take 
with a heuristic ap-
proach to research, try-
ing to see settlement 
through the eyes of my 
great grandparents: 
how they made happy 
homes, full of creative 
projects, guests, simple comforts, and laughter.  
My family’s Mid North imagination was shaped 
by isolation, poverty, and a difficult climate, with 
death close by. Though few of us stayed on as farmers 
and shopkeepers, we learned a beautiful way to relate 
to the earth, to animals, and to each other. The land is 
still so calming and soothing to be in. I have heard 
First Nation people say it is a very powerful land. 
 
rom visiting the region now, I still see signs of 
a different way of thinking. European settlers 
had no clear rules in the early days and had to 
make their own sense of place. Even in today’s “mod-
ernized” homes, I observe signposts of this different 
sort of intelligence: special plants are given indoor 
berths or places under the verandah; garden seating 
allows enjoyment of the natural environment via nu-
merous orientations; patterns of outside shade con-
tinue into house interiors; cupboards and cases are 
filled with the gifts from gardens; lounge rooms with 
recliners and knee rugs afford sociability, mutual care, 
and gathering together via clustering. 
These observations parallel what English opera 
and theater director Jonathan Miller says of home:  
 
I actually think that the function of a great deal of art should be 
to redirect your attention to things you would otherwise over-
look. It’s the overlooked, the negligible, the disregarded, the 
abandoned and the derelict that is actually where the payload is 
(quoted in Cliff 2007). 
Miller’s domestic ob-
servation points toward a 
central premise of my art: 
that nature’s powerful pres-
ence is felt intensely to “en-
ter” the home. Over time, lo-
cals have come to accept the 
presence of the landscape, 
enjoying small mercies, 
adapting and using creative 
problem-solving, enhancing 
home spaces to have a better 
life, without focusing on 
fear. 
I see this pattern in my 
family’s homes and many 
other Mid North dwellings. When I peruse online real-
estate photos from the region, I note how the aesthetics 
reflect the surrounding landscape: leaf-litter carpets and 
minimal yet atmospheric rooms painted the color of 
coral blush to match the soil. Sometimes, an entire 
house is painted aqua in a defiant “cooling” gesture. 
Dwelling features like these are all positive signs of 
a nourishing living in an unforgiving region where you 
can die of thirst, if the silence or deadly brown snakes 
don’t get to you first. There is so much to think about 
from alternative points of view. 
 
Note 
1. “Squatter” is a term used for earliest Australian pastoralists who 
used land before claims and boundaries were formalized. 
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Above: Sue Michael, Booleroo Centre Road, 120 x 150 cm, acrylic 
on canvas, 2012; see next page for more work by Michael.
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Sue Michael, Booleroo Backyard—Panel 2, 60 x 212 cm, 2014. In an email, Michael describes the elderly woman 
who kept this backyard garden: “She often worked all morning and afternoon in her garden, all through the 
seasons. Even on unbearably hot days, she could be found pulling weeds from beneath the shrubs. She was from 




Left: Sue Michael, Booleroo Kitchen, 20 x 38 cm, 2013. Right: Sue Michael, The New Car, 60 x 130 cm, 2014. 
Michael writes: “These simple domestic scenes point to neat, tidy, practical ways, with all that you need close at 
hand. The red dust and drought do impinge, but like a sweeping of the floor, life begins anew, in its own time.” 
 
In describing her painting, Booleroo Centre Road (reproduced on p. 16), Michael explains: “Slices of the coun-
tryside pass us by in the car. This canvas shows shifts, subtle differences, illuminations and undisclosed storylines. 
Like early explorers sketching from under a sailboat canvas, inching along the coastline, I have painted cross 
sections of the land that I have travelled since my childhood. This land is ever shifting and yet still feels the same.” 
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ow better to celebrate the 25th anniversary 
of Environmental and Architectural Phe-
nomenology than to reflect on the endur-
ing importance of EAP’s aims? We hu-
mans are spatial to the core, not so much “lost in 
space” as “found in place.” The public spaces in 
which we speak and act and the private spaces from 
which we emerge and to which we return each day 
form the two domains within which and between 
which the time of our lives plays out. Space and time 
are less Kant’s a priori forms of intuition than they are 
that lived unity that everyday speaking calls “taking 
place.” Place—public and private—is “built into” 
who we are as it is “built up” in our architecture. 
My first ambition was to be an architect, and my 
dissertation in philosophy was on private property. In 
recent courses, I have called upon my classes to think 
open-endedly on philosopher Hannah Arendt’s under-
standing of the ancient Greek distinction of the public 
and private as it bears on our lives today as selves and 
citizens. It seems that the fate of the public and private 
rises and falls in tandem and that, in a trend of long-
making and uncertain outcome, each has become less 
distinct. The result is a lived topography more uni-
form and less human. 
I put the following as a hypothesis to EAP read-
ers: Sociology as it developed in the nineteenth cen-
tury was the expression and product of world-trans-
forming dis-placements brought on by modernity. I 
include within the scope of this hypothesis all the 
Great Grandfathers of sociology but think now espe-
cially of German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies and 
his distinction of Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft, of-
ten translated as society and community (Tönnies 
1887/1957). Tönnies’ rendering of community may 
be somewhat romantic, but society, Gesellschaft, 
stands first and foremost for the marketspace that devel-
oped with capitalism. Tönnies gives us much to think 
about in regard to social interaction mediated by mar-
kets and the “spacings” that ensue therefrom. In any 
case, I invite my colleagues to scan the founding litera-
ture of sociology noting how much dis-placing and re-
spacing figures in the thinking of the early sociologies. 
 
et me shift now from the marketspace of global 
capitalism to the “home front.” Here, I would 
propose to EAP readers a thought experiment. 
Imagine that you are a well compensated, white-collar 
worker or manager or executive or even Wall Street fi-
nancier—or perhaps best for our purposes, a successful 
Willy-Lohman traveling salesman. Every night you 
check into a first-class hotel. Your every wish is satis-
fied by your ability to select your accommodation and 
the attentive care provided by the hotel staff and other 
workers in the hospitality industry. Architecture and in-
terior design work their magic to create a guest experi-
ence with “no (unpleasant) surprises.” Your laundry is 
always done for you, beds made, meals prepared and 
brought to your room if you like. No need to water the 
plants in the room or care for the grounds. Your family 
can stay with you. Baby-sitting and pet care are pro-
vided. 
The one condition in this thought experiment is that 
you cannot stay long in any one location. Whatever you 
brought with you into a room or suite must leave with 
you. You cannot modify your rooms, though of course 
you can move to a hotel that better suits your changing 
aesthetic requirements. If someone were to ask you 
where you might be in three years, you would not be 
able to say. The material conditions of existence in this 
scenario are intended to rule out any negative judgment 
regarding one’s circumstances based on conditions re-










housekeeping responsibilities, or anger with poor ser-
vice. Would such an arrangement leave something to 
be desired? Would there be a basis for calling any 
place in the succession of places one occupies over a 
lifetime one’s own—in other than a very temporal 
sense? What would be missing for you to say, “This 
is my place,” and mean it? And how important would 
it be to have whatever it took for you to call a place a 
room of your own? 
The thought experiment framed here can be seen 
phenomenologically as an imaginative variation in-
tended to achieve eidetic insight into the essence of 
“owness” or, more specifically, into the nature of a 
place one calls one’s own. The bigger, follow-on 
question—one I have returned to recurrently since 
writing my dissertation—is whether having a place of 
one’s own is a constitutive dimension of human be-
ing-in-the-world. 
Would we be less human without a place to call 
our own? Is the reflection initiated above so culturally 
embedded that its relevance to other humans else-
where is questionable? Or is the challenge to ownness 
from elsewhere—in this case, a place somewhere else, 
someone else’s place—already itself testimony to the 
importance of place to our being-in-the-world? Is a 
division of places into those we find familiar or 
strange testimony to a social landscape zoned by mine 
and thine, ours and yours? Is such a social-cultural-
historical environment as much a part of human be-
ing-in-world as embodiment and speech? 
 
n his list of potential discussion questions for es-
says in this special twenty-fifth-anniversary issue 
of EAP, David Seamon asks whether phenome-
nology can contribute to a politics and ideology of 
place. I think the answer is “yes.” For Virginia Wolf, 
a “room of one’s own” meant a place for women in 
the world of literature, politics, and ideas. The book of 
that title is a manifesto of the feminist movement. Con-
tested spaces are drivers of conflict. Holy lands and 
terra sancta enter into secular and political struggle and 
warfare. The global phenomenon of migration and ref-
ugee movement is a narrative of dis-placement and find-
ing one’s place again in the world. 
A few years ago, EAP offered me the opportunity 
to suggest how a micro-phenomenology of living in 
“climate-controlled” dwellings can shape or distort our 
relationship to the natural environment outside (Skocz 
2010). Built space can isolate us from the vagaries of 
weather and climate or the demands on natural re-
sources required to maintain a comfortable living space. 
Our buildings can effect an unconscious and potentially 
harmful suspension or epoché not so much from the nat-
ural attitude as from nature itself. Conversely, there is, 
to answer another of Seamon’s questions, an architec-
ture that makes for better placemaking, one that con-
nects us to our natural surroundings not only aestheti-
cally but also thoughtfully, grounding us in the material 
conditions of our existence. 
EAP is a record of its readers’ and contributors’ on-
going efforts at “getting into place” and demonstrates 
the value of phenomenological reflection toward that 
aim.  It is itself a place for coming to terms with place, 
a home for diverse, imaginative, and timely phenome-
nology. Let me add my words to congratulate and thank 
David Seamon for initiating and sustaining an essential 
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y partner Lisa is fond of saying that we 
go into our academic areas based on 
what confuses and bewilders us. She 
means this somewhat facetiously when 
she thinks about her own area, creative writing, and 
adjacent areas such as rhetoric and literature. She sus-
pects her area draws people who are baffled by basic 
human communication and coherent narrative. 
She’s probably right. I can say that I was drawn 
to studying place in part because it baffled me. I grew 
up on the Canadian prairies, and Saskatchewan is full 
of writers and artists who feel the need to explain the 
mystical draw of wide spaces to detractors in the rest 
of Canada. There is a strong attachment to place 
where I come from, but while I love where I’m from, 
I didn’t quite understand why that attachment existed. 
It’s not that I couldn’t see the beauty or under-
stand the subtle colors and sounds. I still remember 
the smell of the wheat harvest in August and the crisp-
ness of hoarfrost in the brilliant winter sun. W. O. 
Mitchell’s Who Has Seen The Wind? was read by 
every school child, and it both evoked a feature of the 
prairies we supposed that only we could understand, 
and also the invisibility of that feature. We felt like we 
had a secret, privileged knowledge of that place.  
And yet, when it came time to go off to university 
in Ontario, I didn’t look back. It didn’t get into my 
bones the way I saw that it did for others. It was the 
new place that I wanted. Was I “differently-abled,” 
lacking a place-sense that others possessed, and so 
much the poorer for it? Maybe. I went into philoso-
phy, after all, notoriously the discipline least con-
cerned about place, at least classically. Didn’t philos-
ophers rise as quickly as possible to the level of the 
universal, and leave all those messy particulars for 
other disciplines? 
When philosophers did think about place, it was 
much like how Hegel thought about “individual”—as a 
universal concept that attached itself to all particular 
things. Place was like that—everything had one, and 
therefore the philosophical task was to consider this 
shared feature of all particularities. I suppose my attrac-
tion to philosophy should not have been a surprise—in 
high school science, I also gravitated toward physics 
and away from biology, on the grounds that physics 
seemed simpler to me—just equations and laws. Bio-
logical entities were messy—every one of them had a 
new set of facts to know. Every one of them was partic-
ular. Just like places. 
 
e know a lot about the philosophy of place 
but little about the place of philosophy or, ra-
ther, the places of philosophy. We tend to 
think that philosophy has no place, that the development 
of its concepts is historical accident, which is not, of 
course, susceptible to logical analysis and therefore of 
little philosophical interest. 
This perspective is evident even in policies from 
the American Philosophical Association concerning 
ethics. There are numerous statements on aspects of phi-
losophy as a profession but few on the ethics of philos-
ophy itself. If we compare the APA statements to other 
national academic organizations, such as the American 
Anthropological Association, we find that those groups 
reflect on the ethics of the methods and practices of an-
thropologists qua anthropologists, rather than anthro-
pologists qua professionals or university members.  
The distinction is important, as it points to an inter-
esting gap within philosophy. Despite supposedly 
“owning” the sub-discipline of ethics, it is a study to be 
applied largely outside of philosophy itself, rather than 










people and, in philosophy, there are no people. Of 
course, there are people engaged in philosophical ac-
tivity, but there are no people who are the subject of 
philosophy. Concepts are thought to be free-floating, 
without owners, without creators or audiences, and 
without place. So, the APA does not have a policy on 
how those concepts are obtained, or whether there is 
some sort of intellectual property entitlement to con-
cepts, or what happens if a concept is let loose on the 
world and helps or harms someone.  
Given what I’ve said, you might think I’ve ar-
rived home. Someone like me who isn’t sure of his 
place attachment has found the one discipline with no 
place. And yet, this bothers me immensely. This can-
not be right. There must be a blind spot in the history 
and practice of philosophy. Nothing is from nowhere. 
We aren’t gods, and we shouldn’t pretend that we are. 
Philosophy must be in place and be able to credibly 
conduct its activity knowing full well that it is in 
place, and yet not have the self-reflection on its own 
platiality change its activity into something else. The 
platiality of philosophy cannot turn it into literature, 
or politics, or sociology. But how is this possible?  
 
n summer, 1990, I was in Nairobi, Kenya, sup-
porting my soon-to-be spouse in her relief and de-
velopment work. I visited the philosophy depart-
ment, and several more times in the subsequent years, 
mostly to find out what interested the philosophers in 
Kenya. It became clear to me that, while they were 
aware of and engaged in the wider world of philoso-
phy, they were also acutely aware of the image that 
philosophy in Africa had in the rest of the world.  
Not only that. They were aware of the concepts 
that they had to address, which had currency in Ken-
yan society. These were not free-floating concepts, 
available to anyone. They were “live” in the sense that 
they were taken seriously. Some were very traditional 
concepts, such as those tied to witchcraft, ancestor 
veneration, and so forth. Even the most hard-nosed ra-
tionalists in the department recognized that these con-
cepts had currency in society, even if they wished that 
they didn’t. Some were concepts that had a special 
significance in Kenya, given their political and social 
climate—corruption, democracy, political representa-
tion, race. These, of course, are issues in any place, 
but they have a particular significance in a place that 
has emerged recently from colonialism, and has neo-co-
lonial structures in place. And, there was a discussion of 
method—Kenyan philosopher Odera Oruka proposed 
“sage philosophy,” an approach to African philosophy 
that looked for philosophical concepts and arguments 
among traditional sages.  
And so it became clear that African philosophy was 
one site of philosophy that necessarily needed to attend 
to its own place. Unfortunately, that has often been un-
derstood as carving out a space from a recalcitrant phil-
osophical mainstream and asserting ownership over a 
body of material. That’s fine but doesn’t go far. It treats 
philosophical space as if it was a map, and there is finite 
intellectual property that must be claimed. It was not yet 
a focus on philosophical place, the sort that leveraged 
existing into new concepts adequate for Kenyan lived 
experience. To understand what that would look like, 
phenomenology is needed. 
 
henomenology, it should be said, has had place 
embedded in its bones from the beginning. Hus-
serl, following Brentano, started with intention-
ality, which enabled him to move from an empirical in-
vestigation of the world (largely placeless) to an exam-
ination that took seriously the standing and experience 
of the perceiver. Even if his goal was universal experi-
ence, his starting point was a version of human experi-
ence not generalized from the beginning. He had a no-
tion of the horizon, well before Gadamer. The lived 
body and its experience in space was central to under-
standing human experience.  
Perhaps most importantly, phenomenology ac-
cepted that philosophy had to pay attention to non-phi-
losophy. I do not mean non-philosophy in French phi-
losopher François Laruelle’s sense, which is a broaden-
ing of philosophy (Laruelle 2010). I mean that phenom-
enology takes seriously the question of where philoso-
phy comes from, what its lifeblood is, and what its lim-
its are (or at least what the limits of its concepts are). 
Taking experience seriously means that the conduit 
from the non-philosophical to the philosophical was in 
the reflection on the elements of that experience, not in 
some description of the metaphysical structure of the 
world, reflection on the mind of God, or deduction from 
existing categories and concepts. Phenomenology is 










haps the first to allow philosophy to become self-con-
scious about its place, and about the meaning of place 
for thought. It is no longer a philosophy of place, but 
philosophy in place, as well as philosophy which, for 
the first time, sees place as a condition of thought.  
 
any philosophical concepts and methods 
have become useful in a wide range of dis-
ciplines. Sometimes that use is explicitly 
recognized and sometimes, not. Phenomenology has 
turned out to be extraordinarily useful in resisting  
positivist tendencies of those disciplines to reduce 
place to data, as well as the modernist tendency to ab-
stract place into location or coordinates (Janz 2005). 
Even as it provides the conversion of non-philosophy 
into philosophy, it also allows (for example) anthro-
pologists to move from non-anthropology to anthro-
pology without simply imposing a theoretical struc-
ture on the observable world (as happens with mod-
ernist forms of anthropology such as functionalism).  
We might suppose that the non-philosophy that 
philosophy would be interested in would be things 
like myth, folk belief, or tradition. We might further 
include things like the passions, art, religion in gen-
eral, and so forth. All of those have been the subject 
of philosophical thought, at least to the extent that the 
philosophical task has been seen as one of determin-
ing demarcation between what can be reasoned about 
and what cannot (e.g., Kant) 
But there is more than that. The natural world is 
non-philosophy, while at the same time, if Deleuze 
and others are right (and I suspect they are), it is also 
a place that pushes and jogs us into new ways of con-
ceptualizing it. We see the alien nature of the “olfac-
tory poems” of dogs in the misty morning field (to 
quote Aldo Leopold) and realize a legibility to the 
world that has an effect on us while being at the far 
edges of our experience. Place is phenomenology’s at-
tention to the “blooming buzzing confusion” of par-
ticularity and its commitment to the notion that the 
world is always already meaningful, while at the same 
time also strange, opaque, and contradictory. 
Phenomenology is not the only philosophical ap-
proach that takes seriously the border between non-
philosophy and philosophy. We can find this question 
raised in a great many thinkers through the 20th cen-
tury, in one way or another. It is remarkable, though, 
when you start tracing it back, how much even thinkers 
fairly hostile to phenomenology are, in fact, indebted to 
it. Deleuze, for instance, often seen as diverging signif-
icantly from phenomenology, can be seen to be working 
out a phenomenological project, at least if Husserl’s 
later generative phenomenology is the model (Hughes 
2008).  
Philosophy, I think, exists wherever you find it. It 
is disciplinarily within a set of conversations and ques-
tions that stretch back through time and space. But it is 
also the process of making sense out of what already is 
meaningful for us. We experience place as always al-
ready meaningful but also as resisting meaning at the 
same time, as having a kind of opacity as well as trans-
parency. There is, after all, non-philosophy. We take 
meaningful existence and interrogate it in various ways, 
laying bare what is hidden. At the same time, however, 
we provide a conduit from non-philosophy to philoso-
phy. Phenomenological investigation exists in both of 
those moments, both in the constitution of the world as 
meaningful place (including the recognition of the lim-
its of meaning and the presence of non-philosophy) and 
then in our reflective ability to interrogate that world. 
Perhaps philosophy isn’t as placeless as it first ap-
peared. 
 
o I am still out of place. I think I probably always 
will be. I live in Orlando Florida, and I keep 
thinking of Edward Relph’s idea of “placeless-
ness.” Placelessness, alas, seems all too often to fit this 
place—undifferentiated strip malls or the “next big 
thing” to provide economic revitalization. Urban decay 
and homes where the yard is mowed but where no one 
has lived for years, under the theory that, if something 
resembles a place, it will continue to be a place. 
And yet, my very act of living here, along with 
many others, means that this place is intelligible, at least 
to me, at the same time as it is mystifying. It is without 
question non-philosophy. My colleagues in Kenya have 
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henomenology has traditionally been under-
stood to focus on universal structures of con-
sciousness that make experience possible. 
Many thinkers suggest that this perspective 
makes nature merely a correlate of consciousness, 
thus indicating that nature could not possibly be uni-
versal or structural. Other thinkers argue that this un-
derstanding of phenomenology embraces an anthro-
pocentric viewpoint that undermines any intrinsic 
value of nature. 
While these positions may be true on a particular 
reading of phenomenology, I would like to suggest 
here that a genetic phenomenological account of na-
ture allows us to understand that there is nothing nat-
ural about nature and that, in spite of nature’s cultural 
embeddedness, there can be universal elements of our 
experiences of it. These universal elements can only 
be discovered through a genetic phenomenological 
account of experience of nature. The genetic account 
is characterized by phenomenological philosopher 
Edmund Husserl in his later work as an asking back 
into the sedimented layers of the natural attitude. 
Seen in this way, genetic phenomenology allows 
us to peel away layers of cultural sedimentation that 
characterize our constitution in the natural attitude, re-
vealing the way in which the facts of the natural atti-
tude are already laden with meaning but also recog-
nizing that there is a fundamental, universal level of 
experience of nature that supports those cultural 
meanings. As Merleau-Ponty explains in his 1960s 
lectures, “nature is what has a meaning without this 
meaning having been posed by thought” [1]. This po-
sition does not reduce nature to a cultural construct 
because, ultimately, it views nature not as a thing but 
as a ground and horizon of experience itself.  
he difficulty is that many theorists want to estab-
lish nature as something independent of and “be-
yond” the experience of nature. This perspective 
inclines toward a conception of nature as a thing in itself 
landing us back in a kind of Kantian position of a “nat-
ural” realm that we cannot attain. Phenomenology, on 
the other hand, has always conceived of the natural 
world as not a thing in itself but as a thing of experience. 
This thing of experience is not thereby reduced to sub-
jective experience, pure and simple, because all experi-
ence is viewed as intersubjectively, historically, and cul-
turally embedded. 
Phenomenologically, we also recognize that there 
are both the pregiven and the given that characterize any 
experience and that allow us to speak of the constitution 
of nature in that experience. Finally, we understand that 
the constitution of nature is not the same as the creation 
or production of nature. As philosopher Ted Toadvine 
suggested nearly 20 years ago, 
 
The truth of the claim that nature simply is nature as experienced 
is demonstrated precisely by the world, the world we know and see 
all around us. This is the world of our experience—none other. Any 
world with which we intend to deal must come to us through this 
very one [2]. 
  
nother misunderstanding about phenomenol-
ogy is in viewing phenomenological distinc-
tions as separations. In any experience, there is 
a constitutive act and that which is given—these are two 
sides of the same experience and they are distinct but 
not separate. One cannot be without the other. Nature 
cannot be without subject, subject cannot be without na-
ture. It is true that if we focus upon consciousness as the 
sole key to understanding experience then nature be-
comes secondary. Husserlian genetic phenomenology, 










Husserl describes this as the lifeworld way into phe-
nomenology as opposed to his earlier Cartesian way. 
By beginning with the natural concept of the world, 
we draw into question the apodicticity of conscious-
ness in favor of the pregivenness of the world. In other 
words, it is an acknowledgement that we are always 
already aware of the world before we consciously turn 
toward it in analysis or reflection.  
What we must investigate, then, is that world of 
which we are always already aware. What is its struc-
ture? How is it pregiven, presupposed? What are the 
conditions of constitution that make experience of na-
ture possible? This leads to an understanding of the 
constituting subject that is lived-body, in-the-world, 
and a thoroughly intersubjective meaning never sepa-
rated off from the natural world. 
 
hat world with which we begin and from which 
subjectivity or consciousness can never be sep-
arated is what Husserl called the lifeworld. The 
lifeworld is the environing world, the surrounding 
world of our everyday sense that grounds any concep-
tion of an objective scientific world. Does this mean 
that lifeworld is subjective? Not for Husserl. It is a 
false division to establish an objective world over 
against subjectivity. Instead, Husserl speaks of life-
world as having an essential structure that he calls the 
lifeworld a priori. 
This deeper conception of the lifeworld includes 
the objective sciences as well as the constituted cul-
tural worlds of homeworld and alienworld [3]. The 
lifeworld is not just empirical sensuous experience. It 
includes ideas and scientific theories and their results 
within it because it is the pregiven, unthematized, nat-
ural world of experience. 
The general structures that Husserl wants to focus 
upon are those elements of the lifeworld that are 
bound to its relative being as homeworld or alien-
world; in other words, those that cannot be separated 
off from any particular cultural world, but that are 
themselves not relative. These are the lifeworld a pri-
ori. This universal lifeworld a priori is distinct from 
an objective a priori that has been established by the 
idealizing sciences. The sciences are dismissive of 
their own foundations within a lifeworld full of pre-
suppositions in favor of their universal, idealized, ge-
ometrized world. 
Instead, Husserl is interested in the common struc-
ture that all cultural worlds share regardless of their lay-
ers of sedimented cultural history. This lifeworld a pri-
ori is still a perceptual world whereas an objective life-
world is not.  
 One of the ways to avoid the mistaken separation 
of subject from world is to avoid thinking of the life-
world as an object. Lifeworld is not something we can 
experience in its wholeness. It is not something we can 
grasp as an object, not even if we acknowledge that it is 
an intersubjective object. 
This understanding still relies upon an idea of the 
subject as absolute and everything as relative to it—the 
subject as master and commander of world. Instead, if 
we think of lifeworld in terms of its transcendental con-
ditions for the possibility of experience of any home-
world or alienworld, we come closer to what Husserl, in 
his later work, means by the term [4]. Husserl explains: 
 
There exists a fundamental difference between the way we are con-
scious of the world and the way we are conscious of things or ob-
jects (taken in the broadest sense, but still purely in the sense of the 
life-world), though together the two make up an inseparable unity. 
Things, objects (always understood purely in the sense of the life-
world), are ‘given’ as being valid for us in each case (in some mode 
or other of ontic certainty) but in principle only in such a way that 
we are conscious of them as things or objects within the world-
horizon [5]. 
 
he important term here is horizon, which is not 
something that can ever be made an object of ex-
perience but is nevertheless entailed in any ex-
perience, for all experience is horizonal. This means 
that the horizon that is lifeworld is pregiven rather than 
given, that it is the very condition of any objects of 
world as being given. Because lifeworld is pregiven, it 
cannot be described in the same way we might describe 
a cultural homeworld or alienworld, as having particular 
characteristics or a peculiar sense. Rather, it is the very 
condition of the possibility of sense, but which itself 
cannot be made an object of sense. It is horizon and 
ground of both culturally relative homeworlds and al-
ienworlds.  
 To think of lifeworld not as object but as horizon is 
to recognize it as a way in which something is experi-
enced or revealed. That which is presupposed in the 










as horizon of such constitution. It is about a style of 
constitution of which we are unaware and which re-
mains unthematized because it is the very condition 
of constitution of a cultural world and, as horizon of 
constitution, cannot be brought to presence itself. That 
lifeworld horizon is at the same time a ground of every 
experience of homeworld or alienworld, since it en-
tails the world history of earth that belongs to every 
people of earth. 
 
o what accounts for our sense that nature exists 
independently of us and is not our human con-
struction? I would suggest here that nature, in-
sofar as it is given, makes possible the sense that it is 
not simply a matter of our constitution. Givenness of 
anything of experience is what challenges us or calls 
us forth into the experience. A thing draws our atten-
tion, asks for our focus upon it, or makes itself felt in 
the background of a constitutional activity. We do not 
come up with experience out of whole cloth.  
 The importance of a phenomenology of nature 
comes precisely from this particular vantage point that 
phenomenology makes possible. It is the vantage 
point that allows for the theorist to see herself as al-
ways involved in the world and responding to the 
world rather than separating herself from the world 
and making that world an object. 
A phenomenology of nature also allows us to rec-
ognize that, in spite of differences of homeworld or 
alienworld, there are fundamental structures of life-
world pregiven in any worldly givenness. Nature is 
never object to my subject. Rather, we are intertwined 
in such a fundamental way that I can respond to the 
call to attentiveness to nature that allows me to recog-
nize my embeddedness within a pregiven nature, 
while at the same time acknowledging my unique role 
in the renewal and critique of the values that are 
passed along through any response to nature. 
nce we begin thinking of policy-making or im-
plementation, we tend to leave phenomenology 
behind and to take on the instrumental, reduc-
tive approach as masters of nature that we recognize 
theoretically to be problematic. How can phenomenol-
ogy hold us to account? What renewal and critique re-
quires of us is an understanding of traditional ways of 
thinking and responding to nature that establish our role 
as masters of nature, as the ones who can put things 
right. Critique requires of us that we draw that approach 
into question by attempting as far as possible to expose 
the pregiven elements of our constitution and attempt to 
move forward with a new kind of thinking. 
What a genetic phenomenology of nature can offer, 
then, is a partner to the more empirical, concrete sci-
ences that are focused on environmental issues, which 
are issues of world and nature. In allowing us to peel 
away sedimented layers of sense, genetic phenomenol-
ogy helps to reveal the presuppositions of our everyday 
approach to the natural world and, in so doing, leaves 
us prepared for a process of renewal and critique. 
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henomenology has not, for me, been a point 
of departure. I have never thought of it as an 
approach, method, or way of working that I 
might apply. Like most things philosophical, 
it has grown on me more or less serendipitously and 
has wormed its way into my thinking without my re-
ally noticing it. 
No doubt, this home-grown phenomenology 
takes all kinds of liberties with the canonical texts, 
many of which I am happy to leave unread. Textual 
exegesis is a task for trained philosophers and not for 
amateurs like me. I have always been slightly be-
mused by scholars who bury their heads in the most 
arcane and impenetrable of texts in the effort, they ex-
plain, to get to the bottom of our experience as beings 
in a world. You would think that the best way to 
fathom the depths of human experience would be to 
attend to the world itself and to learn directly from 
what it has to tell us. 
This, of course, is what inhabitants do all the 
time, in their daily lives, and they have much to teach 
us. That’s why I remain, both by training and at heart, 
an anthropologist and not a philosopher. If we are to 
begin to resolve the crisis in our relations with what 
we call the “natural world,” then we should be listen-
ing to the wisdom of its inhabitants, both human and 
non-human, rather than taking shelter in the closeted 
self-referentiality of philosophical discourse. 
 
evertheless, in much the same way as phe-
nomenology, anthropology struggles with 
what looks like a mismatch between ethical 
principle and scholarly practice. For while claiming to 
study with and to learn from our interlocutors, we an-
thropologists have a nasty habit of turning lessons 
learned into material for analysis. This is what happens 
when we say that what we are actually doing is ethnog-
raphy. It is like turning the telescope to look through the 
wrong end. Instead of calling on the experience we have 
shared with those among whom we have worked to en-
large our vision of the world, we take our sights from 
the Olympian heights of theory to scrutinize the think-
ing of our erstwhile teachers. 
The source of the problem, I believe, lies with that 
little word of. I have long held doubts about the funda-
mental postulate of phenomenology, namely that con-
sciousness must always be consciousness of, precisely 
because it puts the telescope the wrong way round. 
Likewise, when we invoke the phenomenology or the 
anthropology of this or that, it seems that we run rings 
around the thing in question, turning the places or the 
paths from which we observe into circumscribed topics 
of inquiry. 
The operative word, I think, should not be of but 
with. I would start from the postulate, then, that con-
sciousness is always consciousness with, before it is 
ever consciousness of. Whereas ‘of-ness’ is intentional, 
‘with-ness’, I would argue, is attentional. And what it 
sets up are relations not of intersubjectivity but corre-
spondence. 
 
he problem in our relations with the natural 
world, then, is that we have forgotten how to cor-
respond with the beings and things of which it is 
comprised. We have been so concerned with the inter-
action between ourselves and others that we have failed 
to notice how both we and they go along together in the 
current of time. This, surely, is what sustainability 
means: not the perpetuation of a completed form or sta-











to perdure. If interaction is about othering, then corre-
spondence is about togethering. It is about the ways 
along which lives, in their perpetual unfolding or be-
coming, answer to one another. 
This shift from interaction to correspondence en-
tails a fundamental reorientation, from the between-
ness of beings and things to their in-between-ness. 
Think of a river and its banks. We might speak of the 
relation of one bank to the other, and crossing a 
bridge, we might find ourselves halfway between the 
two. But the banks are continually being formed and 
reformed by the waters of the river as they sweep by. 
These waters flow in between the banks, along a line 
orthogonal to the span of the bridge. 
To say of beings and things that they are in-be-
tween is to align our awareness with the waters; to cor-
respond with them is to join this awareness with the 
flow. Just such a shift of orientation is needed, I believe, 
if we are to understand the world of nature as one that 
we do not only experience but can also live with or in-
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When something has acquired a form, it metamorphoses immediately to a new one. If we wish to arrive at some 
living perception of nature, we ourselves must remain as quick and flexible as nature and follow the example 
she gives. 
—J. W. von Goethe (quoted in Miller 1988, p. 64) 
 
hether we observe a natural phenome-
non on a relative micro-scale (e.g., a 
sprouting spring flower) or on a macro-
scale (e.g., an oak forest through the 
seasons), it is evident that transformation underlies all 
things. While many transformations are gradual and 
imperceptible—consider the growth of a pine tree—
many others are abrupt and even startling, such as a 
butterfly emerging from its chrysalis. Underlying these 
disparate examples is the recognition that change takes 
place in a temporal dimension—i.e., change occurs 
over various time spans. 
We can, however, extend our observations to an 
apparently stationary object, say a wildflower on the 
edge of a trail, and ask whether there is evidence of 
change across a spatial dimension. In other words, does 
the organism, in the moment, offer us a picture of 
transformation among its various parts and structures? 
Furthermore, if we gaze, for example, into a tide 
pool, and we note the differently shaped shells of the 
various snail species, we can ask: What is it that 
changes from one form to another? What form ele-
ments shift (e.g., height of spire, number of whorls, 
number and distinctiveness of ribs) and to what degree 
do they change? 
As I hope to show, these are not idle questions but 
necessary first steps of a phenomenological method 
that can lead us to a cognitive experience of wholeness 
expressed within and among living organisms. 
The pioneer of the particular phenomenological 
path I outline here is the influential poet, playwright, 
and naturalist J. W. von Goethe (1749–1832), who de-
veloped a way of science centered on keen, penetrating 
observation (Amrine et al. 1987; Seamon and Zajonc 
1998; Bortoft 1996, 2012; Holdrege 2013; Riegner 
2013). 
Here, I do not explicate the epistemological under-
pinnings of the breadth and depth of Goethe’s contri-
bution. Rather, I focus on a central aspect of Goethean 
phenomenology: the notion of metamorphosis. As ex-
pressed in the opening epigraph, Goethe saw all phe-
nomena as transitory—momentary manifestations 
moving from a past toward a future. 
Be they clouds, rivers, plants, animals, or the ob-
server, all phenomena are embedded in an ongoing 
process of metamorphosis. Furthermore, by carefully 
attending to the metamorphosis of the phenomenon at 
hand, the observer can be led into a cognitive experi-
ence of the wholeness of the phenomenon. 
In this essay, I attempt to lead the reader toward 
this cognitive experience or, at the very least, to offer 
an explanation of what this experience may entail.  
 
efore we look at natural phenomena, it may be 
instructive to begin with a geometric example 
(fig. 1, next page). As we glance at the shapes 
from left to right (or from right to left), note that shape 










shading changes in a stepwise fashion. Several features 
appear to be correlated and accordingly change in con-
cert. 
If the shapes were cut out and reordered randomly, 
a student would have little problem arranging them in 
the original orderly progression. One would also be 
able easily to draw an intermediate oval shape that 
could logically “fit” between any two shapes in the se-
ries, say between d and e. This is possible because we 
readily grasp the context that gives meaning to the or-
der of the shapes—and is itself accessed through the 
shapes. That context then informs our ability to draw a 
“missing” shape. Moreover, rather than seeing the 
shapes as isolated phenomena juxtaposed in space, we 
instinctively see them as steps in a developmental pro-
cess, frozen moments in a continuum. 
How many missing shapes are there? Clearly, as a 
property of a continuum, there exists an infinite num-
ber of missing or, better, potential shapes in the se-
quence. In fact, between any two shapes, there exists 
an infinite number of potential shapes. There are, how-
ever, limits to the infinite number of potential shapes 
because not any random shape will do. Like hearing a 
wrong note played in a melody, we would immediately 
notice an incorrect shape misplaced in the sequence. 
One final point regarding this pictorial sequence: 
A distinguishing feature expressed through the rela-
tionship of the shapes to each other is that they exhibit 
both difference and sameness simultaneously. In other 
words, each shape in the sequence can be considered 
the same shape expressed in various degrees of modi-
fication. I will return to this point later, but for now we 
can ask: How does this example apply to the notion of 
metamorphosis in nature? 
 
n The Metamorphosis of Plants, Goethe (1790) 
took great pains to describe clearly and objectively 
the various organs of the plant, noting morpholog-
ical details of shape, size, juxtaposition, and so forth. 
One of his many key insights was the observation that 
the plant is all “leaf,” meaning there is one transform-
ative movement, one gesture (not an actual leaf) that 
comes to expression through the various spatially ar-
ranged organs, such as among the leaves up the stem, 
in the calyx, corolla, and stamens:  
 
The organ that expanded on the stem as leaf, assuming a variety 
of forms, is the same organ that now contracts in the calyx, ex-
pands again in the petal, contracts in the reproductive apparatus, 
only to expand finally as fruit (ibid., p. 100). 
 
In other words, there is one ideal organ that comes 
to expression in modified form along the length of the 
plant. This is the essence of metamorphosis: Both unity 
and its manifestation in diversity are entwined in the 
phenomenon. Evidence of this notion includes plant 
structures that are morphological combinations of two 
organs, as if the differentiation process were unable to 
actualize fully; or organs that appear in the “wrong” 
place. This can occur as a “mistake” in development, 
such as the proliferous rose that caught Goethe’s atten-
tion in that it possessed a stem with leaves protruding 
from the center of the flower; or the proliferous carna-
tion that exhibited multiple additional stalked flowers 
growing out of the main corolla (ibid., pp. 93–96). 
Many plant species, however, demonstrate config-
urations of incomplete differentiation under normal 
circumstances, e.g., the familiar poinsettia (Euphorbia 
pulcherrima; Euphorbiaceae), in which the pollinator-
attraction role, usually characteristic of the corolla, is 
shifted to the brilliant red upper leaves; or the neotrop-
ical heliconias (Heliconiaceae) where intermediate 










o grasp fully the notion of metamorphosis, one 
needs to hold difference and sameness simulta-
neously in one’s consciousness (as in the exam-
ple of figure 1). Bortoft (2012) described this cognitive 
experience as an act of distinguishing: 
 
Distinguishing is a dual movement of thinking which goes in op-
posite directions at once: in one direction it differences [read as a 
verb], whereas in the other direction it relates. So the act of dis-
tinction ‘differences/relates’—not differences and relates, be-
cause this would be two movements, whereas there is one move-
ment which is dual (ibid., p. 22). 
 
We can practice this mode of cognition by study-
ing the leaf metamorphosis of a given plant. As in 
many annual plants, the ragleaf bahia (Bahia dissecta; 
Asteraceae) (fig. 3, below), a common plant of the cen-
tral Arizona highlands, exhibits a marked transfor-
mation of the leaf shape up the stem, technically 
known as heterophylly. In preparing this figure, I re-
moved the leaves from the stem and then dried, 
pressed, and arranged them in a spiral, the lowest stem 
leaves at the bottom left; the uppermost leaves and ter-
minal flowers, near the center of the arrangement.  
One can readily see the progression of one leaf 
shape to the next in the sequence. Clearly, no two 
leaves are identical. Note that it’s through their ordered 
differences that the movement or gesture becomes in-
telligible. As in figure 1, there are several morpholog-
ical trajectories that intersect. For instance, note how 
leaf size expands then contracts, or how leaf shape be-
comes less differentiated and then more complex, or 
how the relative length of the petiole (leaf stalk) at one 
point begins to shorten. Regarding the contraction of 
leaf size toward the apex of the stem, one observes that 
the final leaves seem to disappear from space; they be-
come insubstantial so that a new metamorphic impulse 
can come into being, that of the flower. 
 
ased on the preceding, one needs to regard the 
space between the leaves—what I will call “be-
tweenness”—as a crucial aspect of the whole-
ness of the phenomenon. Just as in the structure of a 
musical melody the intervals are equally as important 
as the notes, experiencing betweenness among the 
parts of an organism—a plant, in this case—is the key 
to finding wholeness, or meaning, in the phenomenon. 
Brady (1998) referred to this quality of betweenness as 
the “context of movement,” which relates and inte-
grates all the spatially disparate parts into a unified 
whole.   
Of course, nothing tangible is in motion in figure 
3; it’s only in the mind’s eye that a movement or ges-
ture comes to expression. But once the attentive ob-
server grasps the context of movement—the dynamic 
quality of betweenness in the metamorphosis—it be-
comes objectively evident what may constitute the po-
tential, as yet unmanifested, forms. Just as one can 
draw endless triangles or rectangles if one grasps the 
“rules” that inform them, so can one draw 
endless leaves that could conceivably fit 
into the sequence. 
The next step is to regard how a par-
ticular flower is associated with a given 
leaf metamorphosis. Compared to imagin-
ing a potential leaf in the sequence, this ef-
fort is much more challenging because it 
entails a yet deeper cognitive experience 
of the plant, an experience that approaches 
what Goethe described as the Urpflanze or 
“Archetypal Plant.” Goethe pointed to this 
experience and its associated application: 
 
With this model and the key to it, it will be possible 
to go on forever inventing plants and know that 
their existence is logical; that is to say, if they do 
not actually exist, they could, for they are not the 










an inner necessity and truth (from Goethe’s Italian Journey, in 
Brady 1987, p. 268).    
 
If we direct our attention toward seeing the botan-
ical structures clearly in all their detail, and seeing be-
tweenness not as an intellectual abstraction or as an 
empty void but as a dynamic reality, then we approach 
what can be considered the organizing principle and 
the dynamic wholeness of the plant. Bortoft (1996, pp. 
240–241) describes this experience; note how the dis-
tinction between subject and object, observer and ob-
served, simultaneously unites/dissolves: 
 
The organizing principle of the phenomenon itself, which is its 
intrinsic necessity, comes into expression in the activity of think-
ing when this consists in trying to think the phenomenon con-
cretely. What is experienced is not a representation of the organ-
izing principle, a copy of it ‘in the mind,’ but the organizing prin-
ciple itself acting in thinking.  
 
n the last part of this essay, I outline some possible 
examples of this phenomenological approach 
through which we can attempt to grasp between-
ness as a dynamic reality such that all parts be-
come revelations of the whole. Besides observing 
and comparing the structures of a plant, one can 
apply the same way of seeing to an animal. 
Holdrege (1999), for example, examines the bio-
logical details of the sloth, noting how all its parts, 
including behavior, integrate into an expressive 
whole. No part of the animal is superfluous and 
each has significance in the context of the living 
organism. 
Another approach is to contrast two seem-
ingly very different organisms so that each can be 
used to illuminate the other. Here, too, Holdrege 
(1998) provides an example in his comparison of 
the horse and the lion; whereas the horse accentu-
ates, for instance, the skeletal system and hooves 
by providing a rigid support structure (the horse 
can sleep standing up), the lion is dominated by 
the muscular system, which exhibits remarkable 
suppleness and dramatic swings between tension 
and relaxation (when relaxed, the lion collapses to 
the ground).  
One can apply this comparative method also 
on a landscape level. For example, in the central 
Arizona highlands, the aspen (Populus tremu-
loides; Salicaceae) is a familiar and striking tree. 
It has a thin, tall, straight appearance, its branches 
extending from the upper trunk (fig. 4a, below). Its 
bark is white and even rubs off like talcum powder. 
The individual leaves flutter with the slightest breeze 
(hence the Latin species name) and, in the autumn, turn 
a stunning gold before dropping. One can regard the 
aspen as having an open “sensitivity” to its surround-
ings: the trembling leaves, the thin bark, the dramatic 
seasonal change of appearance, and the delicate, fuzzy 
catkins. More than many temperate tree species, the ar-
chitecture of the aspen resembles a neuron complete 
with axon and dendrites (fig. 4b).   
In striking contrast, the alligator juniper (Juni-
perus deppeana; Cupressaceae), found mostly at lower 
elevations than the aspen but overlapping in some ar-
eas, exhibits a rounded, enclosing crown, in which 
dense clumps of needles sway together when a strong 
breeze moves through the tree (fig. 4c). The bark, from 
which the tree gets its common name, is remarkably 
thick and deeply furrowed (fig. 4d). As a conifer, the 
juniper is evergreen and shows little change in appear-I 
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ance through the seasons, thus a relative lack of sensi-
tivity to its surroundings. Like the tree itself, its fruits 
are spherical, fleshy berries relished by wildlife. 
In comparing the aspen and alligator juniper, one 
notes they are morphological polarities; once these 
endpoints are identified, one has a context to examine 
other local trees with “intermediate” forms. For exam-
ple, the ponderosa pine (Pinus ponderosa; Pinaceae), 
another conifer, with its less dense, more airy structure 
and flaky, even sweet-smelling, bark, exhibits a more 
open architecture than the “self-enclosed” alligator ju-
niper, while the emory oak (Quercus emoryi; Faga-
ceae), with its partly stunted, twisted architecture, 
thick, grooved bark, and stiff, contracted leaves, also 
stands between the juniper and aspen but leans some-
what closer to the former. Just as the leaf sequence of 
an annual plant creates a context for envisioning po-
tential leaves, so a careful comparison of forest trees 
offers a descriptive means to situate particular species 
in a web of morphological relationships (Schad 1967).         
 
he search for betweenness via the Goethean tra-
dition can be extended further to examine an en-
tire group of closely related (or not necessarily 
related) organisms. One ground-breaking work is biol-
ogist Wolfgang Schad’s study of the entire class of 
mammals (Schad 1977, 2012; Riegner 1998). Echoing 
Goethe’s archetypal plant, Schad’s exhaustive obser-
vations uncover the interweaving of morphological tra-
jectories that reiterate in various configurations in dif-
ferent species of mammals. Inspired by Schad’s con-
tribution, researchers have used his approach to inves-
tigate morphological patterns in dinosaurs (Lockley 
2008), birds (Riegner 2008), and general patterns of 
evolution (Rosslenbroich 2014). 
These journeys into whole-organism biology are 
just a beginning. In time, as more studies demonstrate 
the value of a phenomenological approach, a metamor-
phosis of the sciences themselves may lead to new ex-
plorations of the dynamics of wholeness in nature.   
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iven the centrality of the concept of nature 
within phenomenological inquiry, it 
should be no surprise that many philoso-
phers have turned to that philosophical tra-
dition to address environmental issues. In addition to 
the conceptual insights phenomenology has offered, 
the method’s emphasis on experience has contributed 
to creating space for a diversity of voices that might 
not otherwise be heard within the philosophical com-
munity. 
To my mind, however, the most important contri-
bution phenomenology has made to environmental-
ism is the reminder that the philosophical questions 
relating to nature are not merely conceptual puzzles 
but emerge from both our personal and collective con-
nection to and affection for the world in which we 
live.   
Even as phenomenologists have written about, 
among other themes, the human relationship to the en-
vironment and animal life, the narratives that shape 
that relationship, and the constitution and value of 
places, valid and important criticisms have emerged 
regarding various elements of phenomenological 
method. These have included a perceived anthropo-
centrism, a less than adequate conception of material-
ity, and a persistent, unacknowledged subjectivism.  
While in some cases the charges are somewhat 
overblown, what these criticisms reveal is the need for 
phenomenology to evolve and adapt as a method so as 
to meet current challenges, particularly those posed 
by the environment. Specifically, challenges deriving 
from new materialisms (e.g., Karen Barad, Isabelle 
Stengers, and Bruno Latour) need to be addressed for 
phenomenology to retain its relevance. 
The particular force behind these views stems from 
the conception of the world they advocate and how that 
conception both jibes with phenomenological goals and 
requires the reformation of certain phenomenological 
principles. Take, for example, the case of Latour. While 
he explicitly rejects the category of nature, distancing 
himself from the traditional phenomenologists such as 
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, throughout his work one 
finds the same motivation that inspires all phenomenol-
ogists: a return to experience as the foundation of phil-
osophical inquiry. 
What is interesting is how the two approaches di-
verge depending on whether one begins, as in most va-
rieties of phenomenology, with lived experience or, as 
with Latour and many of the new materialisms, with an 
asubjective conception of experience. The former, as 
Heidegger had already noted nearly a century ago, is yet 
another manifestation of modernity’s dualistic subject-
object metaphysics. If the Heideggerian and Latourian 
rejection of lived experience is an apt one, phenomenol-
ogists might learn from these new materialisms a new 
starting point that complicates our inquiries and en-
riches our findings.  
 
n terms of these complications, there are several 
methodological issues with which phenomenologi-
cally-minded environmental philosophers must 
reckon: 
 
 Acknowledging that human experience is one kind of experi-
ence among many and thereby recognizing that human expe-
rience cannot be a foundation for generalizable claims about 
the environment; 
 Understanding subjectivity as a complex network of relations 
formed both through complex biological networks as well as 










 Coming to terms with the less adversarial understanding of 
technology and the sciences that accompanies the attribution 
of agency and experience to things in the world. 
 
This list is intended neither to be exhaustive nor 
to imply that there are not contemporary phenomenol-
ogists already attentive to these issues. Rather, it is 
meant to give a sense of how phenomenology might 
adapt and expand to include insights not only from 
contemporary philosophers but now more established 
lines of critique as found in the work of, for example, 
Foucault and Deleuze.  
The ways in which these adaptations might en-
rich the phenomenological project are also myriad. 
For one, consider the various phenomenologies possi-
ble once nonhumans are acknowledged to have a form 
of subjectivity proper to them! Rather than endless de-
bates about whether animals “have” consciousness or 
reason, the discussion shifts to how diverse forms of 
life display a rationality proper to them by construct-
ing a world of relations for themselves through what-
ever means are available to them cognitively and en-
vironmentally. Though the potential for making phe-
nomenological errors increases, by engaging with 
other forms of animal life in this way we may be able 
to envision better ways to construct a human world 
more inclusive of our fellow non-human beings. 
Including specific technological and institutional 
analyses as a part of our thinking about the human re-
lationship to nature can shed light on the psychologi-
cal and social obstacles to adopting a more environ-
mentally friendly lifestyle: 
 
 How does a certain technique affect our view of other be-
ings? 
 How could reorganizing a specific social arrangement lead 
to a more sustainable way of interacting with each other and 
with the earth? 
 How might we reconsider the notion of community to in-
clude both animate and inanimate aspects of the environ-
ment? 
 
Again, these questions have not necessarily been 
ignored, but the decentering of the human in phenom-
enological research may yield new findings. 
 
s one example, consider some of the ways in 
which many phenomenologists consider the 
concept of nature: following Husserl, as an 
idealized and mathematized object, derived from the 
personalistic attitude, correlative to an intentional con-
sciousness or, following philosophers like Hans Jonas 
and David Abram, as itself an organism and a subject. 
While the latter serves to counteract the kinds of 
excesses environmentalists have identified with the 
modernistic conception of nature (and Husserl himself 
was critical of those tendencies as well in The Crisis of 
the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenome-
nology), the understanding of nature as a subject or an 
organism still utilizes the same fundamental metaphys-
ical categories to understand the world as the modernis-
tic conception of nature, that of subjects and objects. 
If the new materialisms mentioned above have any 
consistent view between them shared with phenomenol-
ogists, it is that the subject-object metaphysics must be 
abandoned. Perhaps what we learn from their criticisms 
is that phenomenology has not been as thorough as it 
could be in expunging these ghosts of modernity. Ra-
ther than considering nature as a being that possesses 
inherent properties in need of preservation, we might 
move toward a more relational conception of nature. Es-
sentially, this shift amounts to a choice between two 
contrasting conceptions of networks: 
 
 On one hand, a perspective associated with the organismic 
conception of nature in which there is an inherent order to an 
ecological system that must be maintained; 
 On the other hand, a perspective associated with the relational 
conception in which the order present in ecological systems is 
largely contingent. In this latter view, organisms do not pos-
sess ecological niches but they create them, and environments 
are largely a result of the creative activity of organisms and the 
geological forces of the earth.  
 
hile I have been emphasizing the need for 
phenomenology to change, there are also 
myriad ways in which the insights of the phe-
nomenological tradition can be helpful to philosophers 
endorsing new materialisms. For example, Martin 
Drenthen and John van Buren have both pointed out 
ways in which hermeneutic methods might be em-
ployed to address environmental problem-solving, both 
in terms of eliminating disagreement and opening up 
possibilities for interpreting exactly what the problems 
are that we face.  
Another possible contribution derives from the his-
tory of phenomenological engagement with science and A 
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technology. Given the similarities between phenome-
nologists’ and new materialists’ criticisms of the mod-
ern scientific worldview, new materialisms would be 
remiss to dismiss phenomenological critique as mere 
doom and gloom or overly romantic and pessimistic. 
In many cases, phenomenological concerns can serve 
as a useful guardrail against slipping back into the 
technological excesses of modernity. 
Last, phenomenologists’ emphasis on the inelim-
inable affective dimension to experience can continue 
to have an important role in decision-making regard-
ing the design of places, especially if the material 
world is more affectively sensitive than previously 
given credit for.  
 
o, if this alliance of phenomenology and new 
forms of materialism is possible, the question 
remains of what kinds of changes in practice 
and inquiry become possible on that basis. To explore 
this question, consider the interplay between concerns 
about embodiment and the question of novel ecosys-
tems. While there may contemporarily be good pru-
dential and political reasons to maintain reservations 
about the creation of such systems, on a relational 
conception of nature there is no way to reject their es-
tablishment out-of-hand and without discussion. After 
all, if there is no one way that nature is meant to be, 
no one order that must be preserved, what obstacles 
are there to establishing new biotic communities? In 
this way, humans may take a more active hand in 
shaping ecological communities in a manner similar 
to what Steven Vogel has called the “social construc-
tion of the environment.” 
We do not, however, need to restrict ourselves to 
what is best for human beings in making these 
choices. Rather, we might aim for, as Karen Barad 
puts it, “making a better world, a livable world, a 
world based on values of co-flourishing and mutual-
ity, not fighting and diminishing one another, not 
closing one another down, but helping to open up our 
ideas and ourselves to each other and to new possibil-
ities, which with any luck will have the potential to 
help us see our way through to a world that is more 
livable, not for some, but for the entangled wellbeing of 
all” [1]. 
Setting some of these ideals as our goals, it is nec-
essary to think through the effects on others’ embodi-
ment, including the nonhuman and perhaps even the 
nonliving, in order to realize them. In this way, our en-
riched phenomenological insights might give new 
meaning to Aldo Leopold’s injunction to “think like a 
mountain.” 
Theoretical constructs, like species, need to evolve 
to survive. At this point in history, phenomenology 
faces both philosophical and institutional pressures to 
do so. To meet these pressures, I will humbly make one 
final recommendation pertaining to our style of writing. 
Currently, so-called “continental” approaches to the en-
vironment tend to base themselves in dense exposition 
of texts. While these can be useful to fellow scholars 
and have value in terms of clarifying the views of his-
torical philosophers, the approach allows others who are 
unfamiliar with (or perhaps averse to) the ideas of the 
philosophers under consideration to ignore our work. If 
we were more open to addressing the currently preva-
lent ideas in environmental philosophy more generally 
in language that is not specific to particular philoso-
phers, this would make our work more difficult to ghet-
toize and to ignore. Philosophers like Ingrid Stefanovic 
and Irene Klaver might serve as models in this regard.  
 
iven the positive contributions the phenomeno-
logical method has made and could make to en-
vironmental philosophy, I hope we rise to these 
challenges. What the phenomenological philosophy 
that emerges from these trials has in common with a 
philosophy like Stengers’ “ecology of practices” re-
mains to be determined. But we should be encouraged 
both by the continuity of concerns between them as well 
as the potential such affiliations have for removing us 
from some of the major theoretical impasses of the 
twentieth century.  
 
Note 
1. Karen Barad, “Erasers and Erasures: Pinch’s Unfortunate ‘Un-
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fter years of full-time environmental advo-
cacy followed by an academic career 
teaching place phenomenology and super-
vising students in phenomenological and 
other qualitative research methods, I immersed myself 
in retirement in place making on Bruny Island, Tasma-
nia. 
Through publishing nine of my essays in EAP, 
David Seamon has generously provided me with the 
opportunity to explore questions relating to place, phe-
nomenology, and environmental concerns. In the spirit 
of giving voice to place that has infused my ‘Letters 
from Far South,” I leaven my commentary with brief 
accounts of some of the encounters my partner Vicki 
and I have had with the more-than-human world of 
“Blackstone,” our 55 acres of land on the island. 
 
he experience of place making became more in-
tertwined with phenomenological perspectives 
and practices as our time on Bruny progressed. 
As various phenomena—for example, the form of a 
sandstone rock shelf or the charred trunk of a 
grasstree—seized my attention, I drew on Goethean 
science, a proto-phenomenological practice, to explore 
them more deeply: 
 
I was drawn to sit much closer, into the enclosure of the fallen 
leaves, and the universe did indeed become suddenly compact. 
There was an odd juxtaposition between the intimacy of the space 
created by the “hair” hanging down to the ground, the breath of 
the breeze, and the harshness of the snake-like “skin” seared 
black. From within the fibrous cave beneath the grasstree, I could 
imagine the movement of the plant drawing nutrients from the 
earth upward, meeting fire and producing such delicate elongated 
leaves that they seemed to be merging into the air. This motion 
brought me closer to a sense of what the gesture of the grasstree 
might be [1]. 
 
Undertaking Goethean science offered a stance of 
openness toward the natural world, an attitude of re-
ceptivity through intuitive sensing. It also raised many 
questions of practice. It took many hours over a long 
period of sitting, drawing, intuiting, and writing to 
gain even a simplified understanding of particular 
plants and rocks from a Goethean perspective. In ad-
dition, there are limitations to the broader applicability 
of this approach. It requires a commitment that many 
people, even sympathetic observers, would lack the 
time and inclination to make. In the latter stages of the 
process I used, the understandings were fleeting and 
numinous—not easily transferable to everyday per-
ception despite their emotional power at the time. 
Their main effect has been to open me to a depth of 
communication and communion with elements of the 
natural world that I had previously not experienced. 
 
y virtue of our choice to produce our own elec-
tricity, rely on rainwater, have composting toi-
lets, and grow some of our own produce, I 
could write more directly about what it was like to live 
more sustainably. Here the power of phenomenology 
in constantly focusing on the experience itself, rather 
than theories or ideas about sustainability, showed it-
self. On some occasions, producing our own power 
was energizing and affirming:  
 
One spring afternoon I was striding down toward the house with 











the sun glinting off the water into my eyes. I exulted in the 
strength of the elements and lengthened my stride. “It’s a high 
energy day today,” I declared to Vicki, and we enjoyed the new 
layer of meaning that term now had for us [2]. 
 
On other occasions, it proved to be more psycho-
logically challenging than I had imagined: 
 
Behind my wry self-description of being “technically challenged” 
lay a psychologically slippery slope. I quickly had to overcome 
my fear of approaching any unfamiliar machine without an expert 
by my side, as all the “experts” were in Hobart and reluctant to 
make the ferry journey to Bruny. Technical instructions from 
Simply Solar by phone about our declining batteries often left me 
puzzled and, at worst, in confused desperation. I re-experienced 
boyhood anxieties about my lack of practical aptitude and com-
mon sense [3]. 
 
Another aspect of our environmental ethos was 
our desire to re-vegetate our degraded sheep paddocks 
and provide sanctuary for endangered and other wild-
life. Our experience was a far cry from the gradual 
deepening of relationship implied by advocates of eco-
logical restoration with phrases such as “restoring the 
land, healing the mind” [4]. The neighboring grazier 
predicted angrily that our land would be a bloody mess 
if we removed his sheep. 
We planted 4,000 native trees, shrubs, and plugs 
of native grasses. We sprayed thistles. In some sea-
sons, the place did look a “bloody mess,” and I felt like 
one, too, veering erratically between despondency and 
elation as the trees grew, but weeds and pests prolifer-
ated. 
There is value in a phenomenological account of 
such processes, if only to provide a salutary tale for 
those who undertake land regeneration, as we did, with 
more idealism than expertise, and to those who glibly 
advocate tree planting as a panacea. In the end, though, 
I was able to write: 
 
I do have the strong sense that as the birds in the fields check out 
our planted trees, the ladybirds and skinks take refuge in the tree 
guards, and some self-sown eucalypts begin to appear now the 
sheep have left, we are working in partnership with the regenera-
tive forces of the land [5]. 
 
Spending each morning up in the paddocks gave 
me the opportunity for encountering more of the wild-
life. Our lived environmental ethic has evolved during 
our time on Bruny. An attitude of care and respect for 
wildlife grew into recognition of the agency and crea-
tive presence of other species. At university, I had 
taught students about moral considerability and the 
rights of other species, but confronting the power and 
fierce gaze of a flesh-and-blood-and-feathers equal 
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was a different matter altogether. One of the turning 
points was direct engagement with the eagles: 
 
The eagle has hovered above my head on several occasions since, 
and each time I have met her fierce gaze as directly as I can. My 
pulse still races and the skin on the back of my neck still tingles 
as I hold all possibilities for the encounter open. It’s another shift 
in attention, I realize. I’m so accustomed to being the one who is 
checking things out that it’s odd to let myself be the object of a 
large wild creature’s curiosity when she is clearly unafraid of me. 
The eagle is calling the shots, not me; she decides how long she 
will remain poised over my head [6]. 
 
t was a similar story with an embodied sense of 
place. One of my favored topics when teaching 
place phenomenology was Merleau-Ponty’s no-
tion of body-subject [7]. It predisposed me toward ex-
plorations in body sensing through Goethean science 
and more generally in everyday life. 
The notion of the inseparability of person and 
world rolls easily off the tongue and pen, but when I 
felt it physically, I was disconcerted. For example, one 
day while floating on my back in Blackstone Bay, I 
distinctly sensed an unspoken “conversation” between 
my body and the enclosing water [8]. In retrospect, I 
realize I was unsettled because I felt that the water was 
not only alive but was in some sort of mysterious com-
munication directly through my skin beyond my con-
scious understanding or control. Body and brine were 
somehow interpenetrating, so that one of the primary 
boundaries of what I consider myself to be was dis-
solving. In less dramatic ways, I’ve often felt discom-
fited on Blackstone when the very experience of 
deeper connection with other species or elements of 
place that I’ve been reading about and wanting to hap-
pen actually occurs. 
I came to realize that lived experience isn’t just 
the sum of what happens to a person. Under the influ-
ence of the phenomenological gaze, as it were, human 
experiencing itself becomes a more active process. 
The question of attention engaged my mind. The qual-
ity of attention as well as the objects of attention—
thistles, marker points, back and shoulder muscles, 
and thought processes—became important while 
spraying, for example. 
In what is almost a paradox, I’ve become more 
actively receptive and receptively active in my ap-
proach. Susan Murphy’s dictum “accept all offers” as 
applied to invitations to pay attention by the more-
than-human-world has become a guiding principle: 
“What deeper experience am I being offered by the 
natural world in this moment? How do I respond?” [9]. 
Perhaps this is an inevitable aspect of the phenomeno-
logical endeavor—a prolonged inquiry into any phe-
nomenon changes both the experience and one’s ca-
pacity to experience. 
The process of chronicling what has occurred at 
Blackstone became an integral part of life, but it 
quickly became insufficient simply to narrate events. 
As researchers such as van Manen have emphasized, 
an essential part of producing a phenomenological ac-
count is rewriting, seeking always to cleave to the ex-
perience itself [10]. “Is that actually what happened?” 
and “What was it really like, as opposed to what I think 
it should be like” became constant questions and fre-
quently exposed how I embellished my accounts. I’d 
argue that my best writing involved a lived reciprocity 
between experiencing and describing: the more I 
honed my writing, the closer attention I paid to my ex-
perience, the richer my life became, thus providing 
more useful material for reflection and further writing. 
 
 have often struggled to communicate what I have 
learned on Blackstone in a way that is helpful for 
environmental action, even when there was a 
shared ethos: 
 
I drove away from the meeting on local climate change with 
mixed feelings. It had been a stimulating event, but I was troubled 
by absence of any mention of non-human life. It was of course 
implicit in the motivation for action on climate change. I knew 
that many of our colleagues shared our concern over the already 
visible effect of warming on the Bruny environments and its non-
human inhabitants. Part of what I had been learning on Black-
stone, though, was that human actions are best undertaken in part-
nership with natural forces, and a place will make it clear what 
needs to be done if one is quietly attentive to it. It is inextricably 
part of daily life, extending well beyond questions of general mo-
tivation. “It’s not just all about people,” I muttered to myself [11]. 
 
There is no shortage of advocates for bringing a 
place-oriented perspective to bear on local responses 
to environmental challenges such as climate change. 
Geographer Edward Relph calls for a “pragmatic sense 
of place,” bringing the voices of local knowledge and 
experience into dialogue while avoiding the patholo-
gies of place, considering alternatives and conse-
quences, and reaching “imperfect but workable agree-










The difficulty is partly one of language. For ex-
ample, discussions about climate change, energy, and 
land use are usually couched in terms of political fea-
sibility and economic costs and benefits. In contrast, 
the language of place affiliation is poetic and evoca-
tive, more rooted in the soundscape of the place itself. 
When I’ve attempted to bring in the perspectives and 
value of other species, I’ve failed to stimulate anything 
approaching dialogue.  
More fundamentally, environmental philosopher 
Val Plumwood contends that we won’t deal effectively 
with environmental crises until we have a place-sensi-
tive society in which the dominant institutions of labor 
and property take place relations seriously rather than 
reducing land to a real estate commodity. Further, she 
argues that we must develop the capacity to enter into 
dialogical relationships with “earth others” [13]. 
I am sympathetic to this view and offer tools for 
such an undertaking provided by phenomenology and 
Goethean science [14]. If, however, human-human 
communication over climate change is so difficult, the 
prospect of including other species in dialogue, how-
ever that is conceived, seems remote indeed. 
 
otwithstanding these many difficulties, I be-
lieve that movement toward a more place-re-
sponsive culture is a worthy undertaking for a 
variety of reasons. Place-based education is richer and 
more locally relevant for students. A greater emphasis 
on local place relationships reinvigorates local com-
munities and leads to a wide range of social, political, 
and environmental actions in defense of place. Place-
based education counteracts alienation and disconnec-
tion from the rest of life with which humans share the 
planet. It provides the basis for a more meaningful, 
productive, expressive, and grounded life. 
Do the “sacred” and the “holy” have a role in car-
ing for the natural world? My ideas about spirituality, 
place, and the sacred are changing as a result of our 
time on Blackstone. Our attempt to provide sanctuary 
for wildlife means more than providing physical ref-
uge as the original meaning of the word as a holy place 
infers [15]. All beings, animate and inanimate, are 
worthy of reverence. Simone Weil’s contention that 
heartfelt attention is a form of prayer resonates 
strongly with me [16]. The choice to adopt an attentive 
attitude toward all forms of the sentient world in which 
we are immersed is ultimately a spiritual one: 
One evening last month, as the setting sun turned the rock pools 
into burnished mirrors and filled the sandstone caves with hon-
eyed light, I was stopped in my tracks by the stillness. Feeling 
weak-kneed, I put down the oysters I had collected and sank onto 
a nearby mushroom-shaped rock. Spontaneously, I broke into a 
Buddhist chant. As my voice reverberated in the sandstone hol-
lows and traversed the still waters, I felt I was singing out a heart-
felt thank you to the rocks, waters, and mountains of the Channel, 
in gratitude for their simply being there [17].  
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ncouraging use of public 
transit is one important 
way to reduce energy con-
sumption and counter cli-
mate change.  In my research on the 
design of Swedish travel centers, I 
have studied the transit stations for 
the planned “West Link,” an under-
ground railway tunnel through 
Gothenburg that will increase the 
capacity for commuter traffic.  
My method is phenomenological; one result is an 
interactive questionnaire that works as a dialog tool 
for identifying “soft” spatial qualities that might have 
value for collaborative planning processes. I ask how 
one might design public-transport spaces that incor-
porate safety, comfort, unambiguous orientation, and 
aesthetic values. A thorough answer to this question 
might help designers and planners to create more sus-
tainable, user-friendly urban spaces. 
 
he French philosopher Merleau-Ponty (2002) 
argued that human beings did not receive sen-
sory impressions passively. Perception, he 
claimed, is active. Via a direct, pre-reflective aware-
ness, we stretch ourselves into the world. Drawing on 
his work, I have developed a research method that I 
call “spatial-sensory analysis” [1].  
The human sensory-motor system plays a deci-
sive role in perceiving and understanding space (Hop-
sch 2008; Johnson 2007; Merleau-Ponty 2002). One 
can speak of spatial affordances or a spatiality of sit-
uation—i.e., the ways a certain space gives possibili-
ties for human action and interaction.  
How we perceive is a theme for psy-
chology and cognitive science. Phenom-
enology offers a theoretical base for gen-
erating architectural design that ade-
quately accounts for human movement 
and sensory experiences as well as ethi-
cal concerns (Hopsch et al.  2014). Phe-
nomenology offers an innovative way to 
address issues of security, orientation, 
climate, and beauty, especially in rela-
tion to contemporary “placeless” environments with 
considerable potential for alienation. 
A phenomenological approach is also valuable be-
cause spatial planning today involves large-scale digital 
representation. To understand lived space, however, hu-
man beings must encounter it via bodily presence. To 
gain a more thorough knowledge of this lived attune-
ment to space, our research group used group discussion 
and explorative workshops to investigate specific as-
pects of spatiality and movement in urban traffic space. 
Participants in these workshops included researchers, 
practitioners, and potential users. 
In the first stage of our research, we developed 
tools to identify and describe environmental qualities 
that might integrate urban public transit with urban 
space. These tools were used in the early planning pro-
cess. Researchers and practitioners were involved in a 
series of dialog seminars to understand how to identify 
and notate taken-for-granted lived qualities and ac-
tions often regarded as “tacit knowledge” (Hartelo & 
Mochizuki 2009; Hopsch et al. 2013).  
 
he West Link Project is an eight-kilometer, dou-
ble-track rail system under the center of Gothen-











services to city mass-transit routes. In 
spring, 2012, a collaboration between 
The Swedish Transport Administration 
and Chalmers University prepared a pilot 
study of the designs for several new 
West Link stations to be built as part of 
the larger project [2].  
This collaboration drew on the 
model of a design research studio. The 
aim was a “hermeneutical spiral” of pro-
gressive interpretive discovery whereby 
perspectives are widened and knowledge 
is deepened [3]. One result was new de-
sign methods and tools that can be used 
to identify innovative spatial qualities to 
strengthen environmental encounter. A 
deeper knowledge of urban spatial form 
in an embodied context created a starting point for 
working with new aspects in the design of space for 
public transportation. 
This focus on sensory dimensions of the urban-
transit experience provided a point of common refer-
ence that allowed participants to consider the experi-
ential nature of transit design. Participants came to 
recognize the importance of a multisensory focus, in-
cluding the significance of haptic experience. Partici-
pants gained a deeper sense of empathy—in other 
words, how to “feel into things” and thereby incorpo-
rate affective dimensions of transit experience. 
Considering peoples’ bodily and sensory expe-
riences of urban space contributes to designing pub-
lic transport in a more user-friendly way. One cen-
tral goal is contributing ideas for designing public 
places with a multivalent sense of meaning. A phe-
nomenological approach is a useful tool because it 
offers new ways to map out questions and to think 
in new ways. This knowledge might contribute to 
urban design and planning that support urbanites’ 
choice of mass transit as a convenient, pleasurable 
mode of travel. 
 
ore broadly, this collaborative study indi-
cated that the way human beings sensu-
ously experience place and space can be-
come the nucleus for interdisciplinary studies (Di-
aconu et al. 2011). Contemporary urban planning is a 
field of interconnectedness and relations; 
there is necessary a trans-disciplinary ap-
proach that bridges gaps between architec-
ture, urban planning landscape architec-
ture, and traffic planning. 
Questions developed within a complex 
context require cooperation and mutual un-
derstanding to achieve resilient results. 
This process can contribute to innovative 
structures that facilitate people’s choices in 
transit situations and so contribute to more 
sustainable urban development. 
 
Notes 
1. Because it is trans-disciplinary, this method has 
practical application within collaborative efforts 
such as urban design and public-transport and traf-
fic planning. The present study is supported by the Swedish Re-
search Counci FORMAS, in collaboration with the Swedish 
Transport Administration. The broader focus of which the cur-
rent work is part is “Architecture in Effect: Re-Thinking the So-
cial in Architecture.” For a description, go to: http://architec-
tureineffect.se/projections/project-practicies [accessed July 24, 
2014]. 
2. For more information on the West Link Project, go to: www.traf-
ikverket.se/Om-Trafikverket/Andra-sprak/English-En-
gelska/Railway-and-Road/Railway-Construction-Pro-
jects/West-Link-Project/ [accessed July 24, 2014]. 
3. Other programs involved in this collaborative study were Istan-
bul Technical University’s Department of Architecture; Missis-
sippi State University’s School of Art and Design; and the Ecole 
Nationale d'Architecture de Paris’s GERPHAU (Groupe 
d’études et de recherche philosophie, architecture et urbain). 
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oogle recently offered early adopters of its 
Glass device a primer on how not to seem 
“creepy or rude” while using the new tech-
nology in public. Sourced from firsthand 
experiences of the company’s “Glass Explorer” mem-
bers, the guide issues a warning against awkward so-
cial lapses caused by staring into the device’s prism 
for extended periods of time. Digital interfaces often 
induce such imperturbable trances as those in which 
smartphone users already find themselves. The social-
ite, shopper, artist, and business executive now wear 
the distrait stare of a lone video gamer, each navi-
gating this unsteady merger of apparatus and environ-
ment. 
There is a vanishing separation of these “aug-
mented” spaces—enhanced by applications, high-res-
olution mobile photography, social networking, and 
the instantaneity of information—from the built and 
designable forms through which everyday life has 
been traditionally lived. As Google acknowledges, 
however, it is still an uncanny separation, continually 
reasserted upon exploring and feeling out its limits, 
finding us all the more prone to sudden jolts and spells 
of disorientation. But the rude affectations of the 
smartphone user (which may only worsen as “weara-
bles” and devices tailored to gestural response gain 
currency) are more telling of discrepancies between 
the habits and norms of a changing technological cul-
ture than of any failed architectonic integration of the 
virtual. 
That one could now feasibly organize her life as 
though the world were nothing more than a vast inter-
net of data is a fact far from contingent upon any spe-
cific advance in visual imaging. It speaks to our im-
aginative submission to the virtual, even where com-
puter graphics fall short. The dream of a “Second 
Life” is after all one of escapism. There have always 
been sufficient, if anemic, surrogates for the real, and 
the vampiric body of the gamer, nourished in darkness 
on the glimmer of televisual feeds, hardly needs con-
vincing of this. 
 
e are inclined to imagine virtual reality as a 
particular kind of interface. In the most com-
monplace of occurrences, however, we can 
find a virtuality that is not set over and against the real. 
Wearing eyeglasses, for example, suggests technical 
mediation of perception resulting in a refocused real 
that, if anything, becomes more real to us than our una-
dorned vision. The glasses become in their virtuality 
second nature, once the weight is no longer felt on the 
bridge of our nose and the frame’s blur eventually lost, 
transfigured into an extension of our face (so much so 
that we feel naked without them). Limits to the appa-
ratus nonetheless appear, as Heidegger suggests, when 
things break down. With a sudden jerking of the head 
or in the midst of an intimate embrace, the awkward 
presence of our eyewear is reasserted.  
But this does not prevent us from experiencing 
clarity of sight as a property belonging to the real. We 
imagine such lenses as “corrective” of our own natural 
flaws in relation to a measurable standard of human 
physiology. In relation to other organisms, other spec-
trums of light, there is no singular, correct way of seeing 
the real. Is an apparatus that filters the world through a 
searchable function therefore less “real” than the focus-
ing effect of corrective eyewear? 
Technology enjoins with our perceptual field in the 
gestural articulation of seeing. Whether or not 3D mov-
ies or simulation technologies such as Oculus Rift—and 
whatever subsequent developments may follow—offer 
compelling simulacra seems beside the point. A low-










high-resolution one. Since its inception, video gaming 
has offered an engrossing experience, one that only 
grows in its scale of filmic excitation. But, as in most 
Hollywood productions, the simulacrum is less than 
transformative; it is manipulative. Such feats of illu-
sion do not therefore set out to sway us of their every-
day factual existence. We already know there is some-
thing uncanny about Google Glass. Such augmenta-
tion and illusion simply exploit what we are willing to 
grant them. 
However immersive the means of virtual reality, 
a horizon of embodied awareness endures. As with the 
sleight-of-hand magician, whose illusions are most ef-
ficacious when we are complicit in their unveiling, re-
ality vanishes only in designated blind spots. The 
magic of cinema, similarly, depends upon a suspen-
sion of disbelief, a partial willingness to accept the 
possibilities within frame. We can ask what it would 
mean then to feel at home in technological virtuality. 
But such a feeling would not correspond to those mo-
ments in which we want to be duped into believing 
something that we have already differentiated from 
our everyday lives. 
A more apposite answer to the question of 
whether a virtual world could become so “real” as to 
be lived as though it were a “real” world should per-
haps instead be sought in the constructed, social do-
main, where integrations of new technologies brush 
against custom and habit. To speak of a “Twitter-
verse” that is both ubiquitous and seemingly nowhere 
is to describe something that has face value to our nat-
ural attitude; it constitutes a “real” connective tissue 
that is felt as an immediate feature of the interfaced 
environment. Our vision plunges into the depths of a 
glowing screen as it does the phantasms of clouds 
across the sky or sunbeams piercing the forest canopy. 
It is here that virtualities are rendered in aesthetic 
transactions of our subjective engagement, where they 
append and fulfill the anticipation of experiencing an 
actual sense of place. That is, they are not merely 
tricks, games, or illusions. They are, like corrective 
lenses, enhancements and elaborations of our visual 
field. 
 
he phenomenological and logistical insepara-
bility of technological virtuality and everyday 
experience seems to parallel that of architecture and the 
environment more broadly. Building does not eliminate 
nature, but rather enjoins in conversation with it, speak-
ing to its sensuous and elemental particularity while at 
the same time fundamentally modifying it. Similarly, 
virtuality cannot, on perceptual grounds at least, be 
thought of simply in opposition to a “real” counterpart. 
Each reflects the other in an intricate and ever-shifting 
composite of feeling and sensation that, as a totality, no 
longer obeys the logic of a finite sense of place. 
At the heart of inquiring into a topology for which 
Facebook or satellite imaging figure prominently, we 
must turn to the contraction of global distances. Mer-
leau-Ponty offers an instructive observation: “Every-
thing I see is in principle within my reach, at least within 
reach of my sight, and is marked on the map of the ‘I 
can’” [1]. The question then concerns what happens 
when this “I can” is multiplied and mediated by tech-
nics, when the map of reality undergoes radical spatial 
distortion.  
French urbanist and philosopher of acceleration 
Paul Virilio recounts a discussion with his wife in which 
she remarks that “what she had found most unbearable 
in the Nazi occupation of France was the feeling of be-
ing cut off from the United States. At a stroke there 
would be no more American magazines, no more news-
papers, and above all, no more movies” [2]. Today, this 
sentiment is given a far more banal expression, as 
“FOMO,” or a perpetual “fear of missing out” that binds 
the tangible here and now to an ever-elusive elsewhere 
borne by visual media. 
Merleau-Ponty’s penumbral “I can” is in such cases 
tempered by an absence made present, a “that which I 
cannot” in the face of infinitely manifestable possibili-
ties. This background knowledge of negated possibility 
aligns with what we might inversely call a real virtual-
ity. The idea of the virtual hangs decisively on its tem-
poral dimension in this regard, its sense of anticipation 
and retention (a point elaborated by Bergson and later 
adopted by Deleuze). “When can I see it?” one asks; the 
where is implied or irrelevant. 
The reality of the virtual is the extension of this “I 
can,” which for the time being privileges the effects of 
lighting and sight. But one can imagine other sensorial 
virtualities that weigh upon our feeling of inhabiting a T 
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particular place. Not least of these would be the po-
tential to administer simulated olfactory sensations. A 
smelt virtually might even convey further contortions 
of spatiality—the onset of some mémoire involontaire 
of a long forgotten place: digital tea and biscuits from 
childhood. 
 
hat I am calling real virtuality is therefore 
a Janus-faced description of technology 
subsuming perceived orientations toward 
place: society becomes not only a spectacle but an en-
compassing “missed connection.” No sooner is ab-
sence made present than the gestural and communica-
tive elaboration of our bearing on the world is met 
with new intensities that enter into our subjective field 
of graspable and mutable potential. Real virtuality is 
apprehended only in the void left behind by its disap-
pearances, after the sights and sounds to which we 
have grown accustomed are noticeably impoverished. 
Conversely, the field of perception is interfaced with 
endless streams of visual hyper-stimuli, the only rem-
edy being to “space out.” This situation corresponds 
with what Virilio suggests as an “overexposure” of 
spatial perspective [3]. Filmic technique becomes the 
organizing architectural principle of this overly illu-
minated landscape. 
The architecture of the world is already and in-
creasingly lived as a virtuality. Architecture has been 
challenged by cinema over its mastery of lighting, of 
imposing special effects upon the action that unfolds 
in the street. Each of us, no longer just inhabitants of 
architectural space, is the self-appointed auteur be-
hind our unique cycloptic perspective and haphazard 
mise-en-scene. We direct the spectacle of our lives 
across various platforms of recording and transmit-
ting.  
Recall that it was within the confounding specta-
cle of cinematic violence that a movie theater gunman 
killed one dozen people and injured more than two-
dozen others several years ago. But it is not the case 
that an inability to distinguish between fiction and re-
ality is symptomatic of this incursion of virtuality; 
such a spectacle differs categorically from really be-
lieving that the magician’s lovely assistant could van-
ish inside of a box. And if there was a confusion of 
Hollywood action and reality, it certainly does not tes-
tify to the realism of the film. Rather, it suggests a 
more totalizing phenomenological symmetry between 
the architect and the technologist. Reality seems more 
cinematic. 
The built environment, which is furnished in a 
manner Heidegger might have described as “present-at-
hand,” becomes increasingly “ready-to-hand” in its 
bearing upon us. We discover a participatory sense of 
its objectivity through which our desires and anxieties 
are reflected back with disturbing immediacy. To this 
effect, a restaurant chain has recently capitalized on 
touch-screen menus in an attempt to mitigate the embar-
rassment of customers wanting to order gratuitous 
amounts of food. 
Through this hybridized, architectonic technics, we 
can look across a boundless landscape. The world ex-
pands through the emissions of screens and electronic 
interfaces, and our embodied relation to them acquires 
a luminous quality. We can at any moment “reach” 
across vast distances, moving through optical connec-
tions, nearing the speed of light. 
How to coordinate a body in an environment de-
fined by its perceptual utility more than spatiality? The 
result seems to be division, disunified and strained at-
tention spans that can no longer tolerate emptiness or 
equilibrium. A new campaign for split-screen “smart” 
televisions advertises the convenience of being able to 
roam around a bombed-out warscape in a first-person 
shooter while simultaneously keeping apprised of the 
football score. 
Perception must in this way increasingly answer to 
demarcations of time far more than of space. Rapid suc-
cessions of appearances—that is, montage—character-
ize our trading off of perspective. We orient ourselves 
as both spectator and auteur, mastering the art of se-
quencing and setting our environment into motion. 
Channel surfing, web browsing, news aggregation, in-
stant messaging, and so on—these are not the activities 
of a flâneur but of a gambler, an individual, suggests 
Walter Benjamin, who is motivated by ecstasies of time 
more than space. Whosoever is lost to the rapid ordering 
of appearances and lighting effects can be set suddenly 
adrift, inhabiting the perceived role of the Joker, now an 
audience member, now the Dark Knight himself. 
 
ith the introduction of video monitors, inter-
faces, and handheld or wearable devices, the 










together. Everything is wallpapered with digital visu-
alization. What does this mean for the designability of 
an environment?  
Place can now be thought out as a moment in a 
sequence, as something we “check into”—a 
timestamped pin-drop on a virtual map. The sequenc-
ing of space into units of time—i.e., events or posts 
on a timeline feed—may force the architect to become 
set designer and cinematographer in one. Meanwhile, 
the city starts to resemble an airport terminal in its in-
frastructural layout, punctuated by wireless “hot 
spots” in the subway and public device charging 
docks. These amenities seek to accommodate instan-
taneous movement across great distances. 
Here, we might return to the ungainly, unwieldy 
aspect of technology. It comes as the blinding flash of 
daylight upon stepping out of the theater, the impaired 
conversability of the obsessive texter. But we cannot 
mistake these lapses of habituation for a return to our 
everyday senses. What makes virtuality real is that it 
has fundamentally changed the architecture of social 
reality; it does not set upon us as a Matrix-like dissim-
ulation from the really real. We cannot, finally, leave 
the cave of shadows for a Platonic light. Virtuality, as 
a basic function of technology that has grown increas-
ingly complex, is part and parcel of the naive every-
dayness of life. In its immediate quality, it enters into 
relation with all other nodes of our perceptual field, 
modifying the nature of the whole. 
Neil Harbisson, a colorblind artist and the first 
person to gain government recognition as a cyborg, 
perhaps illustrates in an extreme way the indissolubil-
ity of real virtuality. Via an antenna embedded into his 
skull, Harbisson can “hear” the sky and “listen” to his 
mother’s eyes, as frequencies of light are digitally 
transmitted as sound waves. “I don’t perceive my an-
tenna as a device, I perceive it as a part of my body, I 
perceive it as an organ,” he says [4]. Much as the cyborg 
offers Donna Haraway an image to dissolve gender es-
sentialism, it undercuts the assumption of any essential 
unity of the real. Modes of perception are diverse, syn-
esthetic, constellational, and always changing. To the 
extent that the virtual can “substitute” the real, it is in-
distinguishable from cyborgism in mediating somatic 
movement and perception.  
The architecture of the world today is of a similarly 
hybridized quality. Perhaps what is needed, then, is a 
cyborg phenomenology, capable of investigating rap-
idly shifting perceptual fields and adapting to the body 
modifications of the embodied subject. Only by think-
ing through the perceptual limits and horizons of the 
virtual can we come to a rigorous understanding of how 
to fabricate better physical and digital architecture. 
Simply drawing users away from the tempest of virtu-
ality does not remedy the disappearance of distances 
any more than an occupied France could forget that feel-
ing of being cut off from America. 
The task for design might instead become one of 
fulfilling, within that digital trance of the virtual, the 
function architecture has always performed: to create a 
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n this EAP commentary, I weave some strands of 
my teaching experience with some design princi-
ples advocated by architect Christopher Alexan-
der. The fact that these related strands from dif-
ferent professions fit together will, I hope, contribute 
to a synergy of constructive possibilities. 
In The Nature of Order and his other writings, Al-
exander champions “incremental development” [1]. 
Rather than imposing a design upon a locale, he pre-
fers to walk the site, develop a plan, and then proceed 
with construction in a way that allows the site to give 
feedback for identifying and modifying subsequent 
steps in the construction process. 
He sees this approach to design and building as 
nurturing the holistic nature of life, allowing a creation 
to emerge through progressive differentiation in a way 
similar to babies emerging from within fertilized eggs. 
The architect does not put together beforehand all the 
parts of a building, which is then assembled. Instead, 
he or she helps the totality of the creation to emerge. 
Alexander insists there is a power and sanctity in this 
organic process that increases the wholeness and life 
of the completed work. 
I follow a similar kind of “incremental develop-
ment” in my teaching at Chrysalis Charter School, a 
small, kindergarten-through-eighth-grade, science-
and-nature school in northern California that my wife 
and I co-founded in 1996. In the school’s ninth year, I 
was teaching literature to the school’s eighth graders. 
We were reading excerpts of Ralph Waldo Emerson’s 
Self-Reliance. As students read aloud from the work, I 
asked them to give voice to the words, not just read 
them. The students did so, with increasing energy, go-
ing round in a group circle, returning to me. I thought 
that I, too, should give voice to the words and thereby 
model an even more “out-thereness.” I approached a 
student and, looking into his eyes, sincerely spoke 
“Trust thyself.” To the next student I said, “Every 
heart vibrates to that iron string. Trust thyself. Never 
imitate.” Around I went, looking each student in his or 
her eyes. 
This experience led, in the next few weeks, to my 
sharing what I called “eye shine.” Talking about it as 
a class, we were more readily able to look into each 
other’s eyes and see a spirit shining within. This effort 
nourished a respect and trust that led over the months 
to exultant reading of poetry and the emergence of a 
class shout, “My beacon fire is lit!” My sharing this 
development with my fellow teachers led one to write: 
“Encouraging the light within each student to shine 
brighter.” A month later, we as a faculty realized that 
this was our mission statement, which we weren’t even 
thinking about until this sentence emerged, unasked 
for and spontaneously. 
 
his mission statement has made a tremendous 
difference to our school: it defines and focuses 
organizational aims in a directed, powerful 
way. This result surprised me because, at my previous 
employment, I had experienced hours of staff time 
wasted at meetings where disparate “stakeholders” 
gathered to produce a mission statement. The result 
was an elegant-sounding “public-relations” document 
that had no real meaning and drew away organiza-
tional energy because it referred to nothing real.  
These two contrasting experiences with mission 
statements mirror Alexander’s two dramatically dif-
ferent approaches to design and construction. Our mis-
sion statement of  “encouraging the light” emerged or-
ganically over many months from what we were ex-
ploring and in response to the children who are the rea-










Some educators are dubious that Chrysalis can be 
organized around “the light.” They ask, “How do you 
measure the ‘light’?” These skeptics want an absolute 
number similar to numerical scores on standardized 
tests. If “the light” can’t be specified in this way, then 
it must be subjective. At Chrysalis, however, we ac-
cept that this “light” is an objective reality. A teacher 
doesn’t need absolute numbers to navigate by it. Ra-
ther, one focuses on relative changes. What things 
make the “light” brighter? What things tend to make 
the “light” dim? The aim is always to navigate toward 
more “light.”  
Frequently, I’ve had to defend our mission state-
ment from critics. Here is a typical conversation: 
 
“Yes, encouraging the light sounds nice but what about the 
real work of teaching the kids?”  
“The real work is encouraging the light.”  
“Yes, but what are you teaching them?”  
“That depends on the teacher and the students.”  
“But you need to teach the grade-level standards.” 
“No, we are a chartered public school governed by our char-
ter. We are exploring a different way of organizing public educa-
tion.”  
“But how can you assure parents that their child is receiving 
all the grade-level standards?” 
“Parents don’t ask. They want to see the light shining within 
their child.” 
“Well, how can you assure the State of California that your 
students are being taught the grade-level standards?” 
“By the state’s standardized tests. Our students on average 
perform significantly higher than schools of similar de-
mographics.” 
“But are you teaching to the standards?” 
“No, we are encouraging the light within each student to 
shine brighter. And one of the ways you encourage the light is 
offering each student the experience of understanding the con-
cepts we are working with. So it is not enough to cover the mate-
rial and pass a test. That does not necessarily encourage the light. 
The key concern is whether the child experiences understanding. 
We ‘light up’ when we understand something. That’s what we 
focus on at Chrysalis. In addition, a student’s light can shines 
brighter when he or she knows they are safely within a kind, gen-
tle environment, So we spend a lot of time working to transform 
the ‘unkind’ culture that kids bring from television and other 
schools into a kind one. We greet students as they arrive on cam-
pus. Our ‘light shines’ when we are out in nature so we take the 
students out into nature every week. Our ‘light shines’ when we 
are known and honored as individuals, so we have structured the 
school to have small classes that emphasize helpful feedback ra-
ther than judgmental grades.” 
 
avigating by the light brings me to another 
parallel with Alexander’s work, which un-
folds in a similar “subjective” way. He ex-
plains: 
 
…. Let’s say, if I’m trying to make a modest building, what do I 
do? I do consciously try to make the building move from its not 
very good current state toward a state in which you’re more likely 
to experience “God” in that building. And that tells me very often 
what to do. It’s not just some sort of great wish, it actually tells 
me, “Look, make this column bigger”…. [2]. 
 
The relative presence of “God” referred to here 
obviously can’t be measured quantitatively. Rather, 
like us teachers at Chrysalis, Alexander is navigating 
by relative differences. For him, the question of rela-
tive life and wholeness in a design keeps reappearing 
throughout the making process so that the end product 
might become a slow accumulation of many smaller 
decisions all moving in the same intentional direction 
toward the worthy ends of appropriateness, beauty, 
and belonging. 
 
he last question I want to address here is why 
moments of intuitive perception, important for 
both Alexander and Chrysalis teaching, sustain 
“lighting up”? What are we intuitively perceiving in 
these special moments, and why do they inspire spon-
taneous joy? Helpful here is the work of philosopher 
and science educator Henri Bortoft, who explains that 
this moment of insight is: 
 
not to be thought of as a generalization from observations, pro-
duced by abstracting from different instances something that is 
common to them. If this result were the case, one would arrive at 
an abstracted unity with the dead quality of a lowest common fac-
tor… In a moment of intuitive perception, the particular instance 
is seen as a living manifestation of the universal [3]. 
 
About the time I read this passage, I had witnessed 
just such a moment for one of my students. I had been 
field-testing a science unit that used a local plant to get 
elementary students interested in field biology. Part of 
the unit was on how flowers develop into seed-con-
taining fruits. One of the activities (called “forms of 
the process”) asked students to collect ten specimens 
of the readily found Erodium botrys (commonly 
known as long beaked stork’s bill) at different stages 
of flowering development and then arrange the speci-










One student’s set of specimens was such that there 
was a gap in the middle, and he could not see any 
broader pattern. He had some examples of the flower’s 
dropping its petals and its ovules starting to swell; he 
also had some examples of the plant style growing pro-
gressively longer. But in between was a gap prevent-
ing him from seeing all his specimens as part of one, 
dramatic transformation. The student was dutifully do-
ing the activity but was frustrated because he knew he 
somehow wasn’t “getting it.” 
I went out to find a specimen that would fit ex-
actly in the middle of the gap. When the student added 
the specimen to his flowering sequence, a spontaneous 
“WOW!” burst forth, and his face lit up. As Bortoft 
explains, “In a moment of intuitive perception, the par-
ticular instance is seen as a living manifestation of the 
universal” [4].  
 
o what is it about phenomenology that I think 
I’ve understood, even though I would never 
claim to be a phenomenologist? What I think I 
understand is that there is a way of seeing that can hap-
pen through direct experience. These moments of un-
derstanding are wonderful and they “light us up.” They 
are the core of Alexander’s approach to understanding 
and making. They are the core of our pedagogical ef-
forts at Chrysalis. 
These similarities between Chrysalis and Alexan-
der’s work help me as a teaching professional to feel 
less alone. These similarities strengthen my desire to 
keep navigating “by the light.” I hope the experiences 
I have described here with my Chrysalis pupils might, 
in a parallel way, strengthen the desire of architects to 
work in the manner explored by Alexander. 
 
Notes 
1. C. Alexander, The Nature of Order, four vols. (Berkeley, CA: 
Center for Environmental Structure, 2002–05). 
2. From an interview available at: www.patternlanguage.com/ar-
chives/wendykohn/wendykohninterviewedited.htm [last ac-
cessed June 24, 2014]. 
3. H. Bortoft, Counterfeit and Authentic Wholes: Finding a 
Means for Dwelling in Nature, in D. Seamon and R. 
Mugerauer, eds., Dwelling, Place and Environment (Dor-
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 understand the phenomenologist’s challenge to 
be that of embracing both “point of view” and 
“objectivity,” which, as I see it, is also that of in-
tellectual endeavor at its most ambitious. Let me 
illustrate what I mean by these two terms, first, at the 
microscale; then, at the macroscale. 
 
Microscale 
What I see is always a point of view—my point of 
view. What I hear, by contrast, is more circumambient 
and so less subjective. What I smell is even less sub-
jective, more “in the round,” and more a quality that 
emanates from something “out there.” Heidegger, I be-
lieve, once praised the sense of smell for that reason. 
The visual, being a point of view, is—as I just said—
subjective, and yet that subjectivity diminishes as the 
viewer approaches the object so viewed. 
I see the Washington Monument from afar. It is in 
my field of vision. I dominate it. As I approach it, how-
ever, this is less and less true, until under its shadow I 
feel it to be the looming presence (subject) and me a 
mere speck (an object) in its shadow. Phenomenolo-
gists, eschewing objectivity, tend to emphasize the 
“point of view” or the subjective. This is a mistake, for 
the human experience includes both. 
 Point of view is from somewhere. By contrast, the 
view from nowhere is from God’s position way up in 
the sky, hence objective. (The terminology of “some-
where” and “nowhere” is Thomas Nagel’s.) We are ca-
pable of both. What we are not capable of or, rather, 
what we are not good at is to see from someone else’s 
position. Chaos would ensue if this were all there is to 
perception, but of course it isn’t. By virtue of our in-
nate ability to see also from “nowhere,” we share a 
common world. 
A simple experiment will show this to be true. Put 
a three-dimensional model of hills, valleys, streams, 
and farms on a table. Have two persons A and B stand 
on opposite sides. Ask A to describe what B sees from 
his side of the table and vice versa. The task will be 
difficult for both, and yet both can describe with rela-
tive ease what they can see from a point high above, 
even though neither has been there! 
 
Macroscale 
The art of the novel peaked in the nineteenth century. 
It was also in the nineteenth century that social science 
and phenomenology were being established. At that 
time, these three endeavors to understand human real-
ity had much in common. The novelist strove to cap-
ture the society of the time. Madame Bovary had the 
subtitle “moeurs de province.” Balzac’s La Comédie 
Humaine was a monumental effort to depict life in all 
its variety. The great novelists sought to be objective 
by drawing attention, as would a sociologist, to the so-
cial and economic forces at work. They also provided 
technical information of the sort one might find in a 
manual. Thomas Hardy described how a tractor 
worked and wasn’t bothered by the departure from 
plot line. Herman Melville famously—or perhaps in-
famously—made a part of Moby Dick read like a tract 
for whaling. 
 Also on the objective side of the ledger in the 
work of a great novelist is a large, overarching theme 
such as the nature of war in Tolstoy’s War and Peace, 
or the nature of time in Proust’s À la recherche du 
I 
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temps perdu. Of course, this large, overarching theme 
is the novelist’s and is, in that sense, a point of view 
and subjective. But my point is that a theme so large 
and inclusive is, humanly speaking, a view from no-
where, a God-like view, within which is a host of in-
dividuals, each of whom has a past, a socioeconomic 
position, and a distinctive perspective. 
 Now, to the extent that phenomenologists engage 
in “psychological description,” they are poets, short-
story writers, or novelists. Heidegger, frustrated by the 
inadequacy of prose to capture human reality, resorted 
to the poetry of Hölderlin, but he would have done bet-
ter, be a great phenomenologist and novelist if, in a 
masterwork peopled by hundreds of characters, he in-
cluded a poet named Hölderlin! In the twenty-first 
century, a phenomenologist-novelist might not feature 
a poet in his work, but he would surely have to include, 
besides bakers and car dealers, academic types such as 
feminists and Marxists. In other words, the issue is not 
phenomenology being critiqued by feminists and 
Marxists, but rather that they appear as colorful char-
acters in a masterwork of phenomenology. 
 What is the use of such a masterwork in phenom-
enology? The use is twofold: one that it is a mirror to 
society but, then, if it is indeed such a mirror, it is also 
a plan for society’s improvement. The usual plans de-
signed by government and commercial bureaus are too 
thin and abstract to serve that function adequately. On 
the other hand, the poet’s or short-story writer’s work, 
phenomenological in its psychological acumen but 
without the broader frame that is also phenomenol-
ogy’s calling, is too dense and limited to be of use 
other than for a narrow purpose, such as building a 
homeless shelter or an airport. A masterwork in phe-
nomenology rises above these limitations. 
 
A Theoretical Human Endeavor 
Finally, just as a great realistic novel has many char-
acters, none of whom actually existed, so a great phe-
nomenological treatise can be deemed a work of socio-
economic and psychological realism even though it 
contains individuals none of whom actually existed 
but who are postulated to represent a human type or 
hint at a human condition. In this sense, phenomenol-
ogy is “theoretical.” Is this a fault? Not really, for this 
bent toward theory and abstraction is a weakness in all 
mental endeavors. Only God who knows the number 
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n this essay, I discuss what I see as central to the 
advancement of EAP in the next quarter century: 
developing a sophisticated, robust phenomeno-
logical dialogue with analytic science. This dia-
logue is necessary because it is increasingly difficult, 
if not impossible (theoretically and practically), to ad-
vance insights, observations, or allegations without of-
fering empirical evidence. 
Quite simply, rhetorical craftsmanship, logical ar-
gument, poetic writing, and impeccable credentials are 
no longer enough to cement the legitimacy of research 
claims. In their place, science, the source of most of 
our practical knowledge and technology, has de facto 
become today’s only widely agreed method to validate 
arguments and hypotheses. Science is therefore a fun-
damental power broker in all important decisions af-
fecting us, be they related to environmental, psycho-
logical, social, political, or economic matters. 
Signs of this condition abound. The rapid rise of 
evidence-based design is but one example of an accen-
tuating trend. We can be upset and enumerate the many 
problems and biases behind this state of affairs, but the 
fact remains uncontestable. Instead of resisting, a more 
productive path would be to think of science as another 
perspective, language, and method that can be used 
when considering phenomenological questions, in-
sights, and recommendations. We teachers, profes-
sionals, and designers know this very well. If we are 
to engage students, clients, and users productively, we 
must speak to their concerns, in their language, using 
their logic.  
s this matter-of-fact recognition indicative of a ca-
pitulation to an instrumentalist, reductionist, and 
materialistic worldview? Are we betraying the 
spirit of phenomenology? Here, we must carefully 
avoid rushing to an answer grounded in the claim that 
phenomenologists profoundly distrust, if not reject, 
the natural sciences as a means for probing phenome-
nological issues. This perspective began with the com-
pelling foundational work of such thinkers as Gaston 
Bachelard and Steen Rasmussen. The perspective pro-
gressively became mainstream with architectural the-
orist Alberto Pérez-Gómez’s insightful Architecture 
and the Crisis of Modern Science [1]. 
These and other phenomenologically-inspired 
thinkers asked how anyone can accept positivist reduc-
tionism to describe, much less pinpoint or explain, the 
complex thickness of lived experience. These thinkers 
claimed that, since subjective experience is inaccessi-
ble from without, it cannot be probed directly by sci-
entific method and therefore must always remain be-
yond empirical measurability. 
I would argue that this formulaic view of phenom-
enology as anti-scientific has never been true. Phe-
nomenology began with founder Edmund Husserl’s 
famous exhortation of “back to the things themselves” 
in response to obscure philosophical analyses and ab-
stractions lacking little relation to lived experience. 
This “going back to things” involved a contemplative 
science of sorts: the direct, unbiased observation of 
first-person experience of reality and consciousness. 
Husserl developed a specific method, the “phenome-
nological reduction,” as a way to put aside all content 
of consciousness to “objectively” access what is really 
I I 
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present in experience. I don’t necessarily defend or 
criticize Husserl’s “reduction.” Rather, I bring it for-
ward to highlight his affinity with scientific method in 
the sense of taking nothing for granted and instead 
seeking to apply objective observation to subjective 
psychological events [2]. 
 
f phenomenology’s beginning is marked by Hus-
serl’s aim to bring a kind of scientific sensibility 
into matters of philosophy, other phenomenolo-
gists following Husserl used science as a springboard 
to clarify their understandings of phenomenological 
principles and conclusions. 
For example, philosopher Maurice Merleau-
Ponty criticized standard philosophy and science by 
arguing that human cognition is unavoidably embod-
ied and therefore neither purely intellectual and de-
tached nor merely physiological and reactive. He 
painted a deliciously nuanced account of our lived 
world replete with sensuality, emotions, contextuality, 
and concreteness [3]. Merleau-Ponty’s critique of sci-
ence did not, however, mean ignoring or eliminating 
it. In fact, some commentators have argued that he saw 
the future of phenomenology as embracing some type 
of “naturalization”—in other words, a disciplined, 
skillful coupling of phenomenology and the natural 
sciences [4]. 
Another productive conversation between science 
and phenomenology is seen in the thinking of philos-
opher Hans-Georg Gadamer, who worked to demon-
strate that interpretations are the only way to penetrate, 
however superficially, any claim on reality [5]. Turn-
ing Husserl’s “reduction” on its head, Gadamer argued 
that it is the prejudices we bring to any particular situ-
ation that make interpretation at all possible, hence the 
fundamental flaw and naiveté of ordinary science 
when it demands or expects “objectivity.” 
 
ne can also look to the latest phenomenologi-
cal criticism of modernity and the scientific 
project. According to philosopher Jean-Luc 
Marion, our encounter with reality transcends us at 
every turn by what he calls its “saturation” [6]. He ar-
gues that the nature of an event always exceeds our 
capability to make sense of it, much less to control it. 
At best, we can deploy a “reduction” (in Husserl’s 
sense) so that we can access the “given” (the phenom-
enon) as gift. In this act, we may realize a transcend-
ence of being and some mode of spiritual presence. 
Philosopher Karsten Harries makes a similar point: 
that reality is real precisely because it does not con-
form to our desires but rather resists and, sooner or 
later, wins over our best attempt at subjugating it. The 
phenomenological conclusion is that reality transcends 
human beings. However powerful, instrumentalist sci-
ence and applied technologies cannot ultimately solve 
the dilemmas of human existence [7]. 
Perhaps what is most remarkable about these phe-
nomenological insights is they did not lead phenome-
nology to radical subjectivism, relativism, or nihil-
ism—an end for some philosophical positions such as 
existentialism and post-structuralism. Nor did these 
phenomenological insights lead to a rejection of sci-
ence but only to the refutation of scientism, its most 
simplistic representation. 
Here, we ask the reason for such equanimous re-
sponse. I suggest that, in their heart of hearts, phenom-
enologists are pragmatists. They truly want to deal 
with the experience of the world as lived and to under-
stand human being-in-the-world. They are not keen on 
generating far-fetched philosophical models or adopt-
ing radical ideological positions. Given this no-non-
sense attitude, phenomenologists are ready to accept 
experience-based knowledge and utilize it for advanc-
ing lived reality either actively (e.g., via the design of 
the built environment) or receptively (e.g., via human 
interaction with that built environment). 
This pragmatic attitude has been a significant part 
of EAP since its beginning. The scholarship of Yi-Fu 
Tuan, Christian Norberg-Schulz, Edward Relph, and 
David Seamon always included references to scientific 
evidence supporting their claims (e.g., in environmen-
tal psychology, gestalt psychology, anthropology, ge-
ography and sociology) [8]. Empirical evidence was 
also central to Christopher Alexander and Thomas 
Thiis-Evesen’s insightful observation and “catalogu-
ing” of phenomenology-based typologies of architec-
tural forms (pattern language and archetypes, respec-
tively) [9]. This pragmatic attitude continues today. 
For example, architectural theorists Alberto Pérez-
Gómez and Juhani Pallasmaa emphasize the claims of 
neuroscience that support long-held phenomenologi-










embodiment, and environmental experience in general 
[10]. 
If there is nothing new in using empirical evi-
dence to strengthen phenomenological claims, there is 
some novelty in the increasing mention of scientific 
understandings in the phenomenological literature. 
This development may be an indication that the natural 
and social sciences are finally beginning to consider 
the phenomenological critique of science that began 
with Husserl’s work in the early twentieth century. 
 
o contribute to research and practice in the 
twenty-first century, phenomenologists must 
find ways to better authenticate their discover-
ies and claims [11]. How, in other words, might phe-
nomenological research expand its typical emphasis 
on smaller-scale self-observation and hermeneutics to 
include empirical measurement providing more objec-
tive validation to otherwise unreliable or unverifiable 
first-person accounts or relativistic qualitative inter-
pretations? 
 Quantifying the qualitative dimensions of any 
phenomenon may ultimately be impossible, and I am 
not advocating an absolute threshold of trustworthi-
ness (which is never really possible in a positivist 
mode of research either). In this regard, the social sci-
ences have developed a wide range of qualitative 
methods to identify less tangible aspects of cultural, 
educational, psychological, and related phenomena 
[12]. 
One also notes that recent developments in neuro-
science have allowed researchers to non-invasively 
observe the neural correlates of mental states. Adopt-
ing the scientific method phenomenologically means 
for phenomenologists to develop hypotheses, deploy 
practical procedures, gather data, conduct analyses, 
and produce findings that convincingly characterize 
phenomena. From one point of view, the aim can be 
phrased as the construction of probabilistic empirical 
mappings of phenomena.  
Though some phenomenologists might disagree 
with this aim, I don’t think it is farfetched or phenom-
enologically inappropriate. One can argue that con-
crete steps in this direction began in the early 1980s 
via the insights and leadership of Chilean scientist 
Francisco Varela, among others. This effort led to the 
development of neurophenomenology, an area of sci-
entific investigation that has steadily grown in signifi-
cance in the last two decades [13]. My call to use sci-
entific method to test phenomenological claims also 
parallels efforts in “experimental philosophy” (“X-
Phi”), an innovative reflective practice working to ex-
amine empirically philosophical topics that have re-
sisted scrutiny via more conventional analytical rea-
soning [14]. 
There is no reason why we cannot judiciously 
bring science into phenomenological inquiry, devise 
appropriate methodological adaptations and, thereby, 
lead scientists into new considerations and questions 
that evade them due to their quantitative training and 
worldview. In fact, some successful examples of this 
line of inquiry already exist. Running the risk of self-
promotion, I would like to highlight two research pro-
jects I have been successfully conducting that manage 
to investigate highly qualitative claims within a scien-
tific, empirical framework. 
 The first of these projects is a large survey on “Ex-
traordinary Architectural Experiences” that seeks to 
map the phenomenological nature of these transform-
ative events. In this research, I use a very large number 
of self-reported experiential accounts to validate (via 
statistical analysis) otherwise unreliable first-person 
accounts [15]. The second research project uses neu-
roscience to probe the phenomenology of contempla-
tive spaces. Here, I employ non-invasive brain imag-
ing (e.g., functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, or 
fMRI) to gauge physiologically the cerebral activity of 
individuals “experiencing” contemplative environ-
ments [16]. 
 
he adoption of novel, non-reductionist methods 
of scientific observation and analysis should 
not unsettle phenomenologists because I em-
phasize emphatically that my critique does not require 
that more conventional phenomenological modes and 
methods be forsaken. My critique does imply, how-
ever, that phenomenologists consider a more encom-
passing, scientifically-engaged mode of phenomenol-
ogy. Just as we cannot speak of one unique paradigm 
to describe all phenomena in physics (e.g., Newtonian, 
quantum, and relativistic models all have their accura-
cies but at different space-time scales), one mode of 
phenomenology cannot address the inexhaustible 
realm of human being and experience.  










science or the subordination of one to the other are 
false options. A more comprehensive approach re-
quires a respectful, judicious, and mutually beneficial 
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avid Seamon’s invitation to write some-
thing for this anniversary edition of EAP 
(which I have subscribed to since it began 
a quarter-century ago) led me to reflect on 
books that have had a long-term influence on my 
thinking about place and landscape. 
I soon realized there are a handful of writings I 
have often turned to because they are inspiring models 
of phenomenological description. I have referred to 
these works infrequently in my writing, and some may 
not be familiar to EAP readers, so this invitation pro-
vides me with an opportunity to share them, if only as 
brief synopses scarcely doing them justice. The fact 
that none of these works are recent probably reflects 
my distaste for the current tendency to look at the 
world through theoretical lenses. 
What I mean by phenomenological description is 
broader than the philosophical method developed by 
Husserl and used by Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and 
others. While the work of these philosophers has cer-
tainly influenced my thinking, the approaches I men-
tion here have different, unrelated provenances. Most 
make no reference to phenomenology, but I regard 
them as implicitly phenomenological because they all 
demonstrate ways to return to experiences of things in 
themselves. They attempt, as Edward Said claimed of 
humanism, to dissolve what William Blake called 
“mind forg’d manacles” for the purposes of reflective 
understanding. Several focus on ways of seeing, a 
theme that corresponds with my interests in landscapes 
and the visual properties of places. I begin with those 
[1]. 
 
n 1786, as Goethe set out on a journey to Italy to 
escape his problems in Weimar, he wrote in his di-
ary that he was determined to see “with clear fresh 
eyes.” He looked carefully at everything he encoun-
tered—architecture, trash, trees, clouds, mountains, 
landscapes, people, and the fashions they wore. At one 
point, he exclaimed, “I have spent the day just looking 
and looking. It is the same in art as in life. The deeper 
one penetrates, the broader grows the view.”  This idea 
of “clear fresh eyes’ has served me as a sort of touch-
stone as an unprejudiced way to study places, and the 
results it has given are a basis for trusting my own 
judgments and reducing dependence on the opinions 
and theories of others [2].  
I regard renowned critic of art and society John 
Ruskin as among the very best interpreters of land-
scape. I recently visited an exhibition displaying some 
of his thousands of detailed drawings and paintings, 
many never published, all based on careful, precise ob-
servation. Apparently, he made them to help in under-
standing the characteristics of different types of rocks, 
plants, colors, clouds, mountains, buildings, and town-
scapes. This understanding then informed the critical 
commentaries he wrote and published. 
To prepare for The Stones of Venice, a book that 
influenced William Morris, Marcel Proust, Gandhi, 
and many others, Ruskin had scaffolding erected in the 
cathedral of San Marco so that he could draw the cap-
ital of every column as well as many other decorations 
[see sketch, next page]. This exercise gave him an in-
tense, direct knowledge of gothic architecture that en-
abled him, in effect, to think himself into the experi-
ences of the people who had made what he was look-
ing at—experiences based in deep convictions and be-
liefs that Ruskin claimed were instinctively expressed 
in the carved decorations. 
By comparison, he regarded the gothic revival ar-










his life in the Victorian age 
as trivial and thoughtless, no 
matter how precisely made. 
Insofar as they revealed any-
thing, it was a division of la-
bor that had broken human 
beings into “small crumbs 
and fragments of life” [3].  
I am especially intrigued 
by Ruskin’s attempt, as an 
art critic, to identify different 
forms and functions of imag-
ination because imagination 
is a phenomenon really ac-
cessible only to phenomeno-
logical approaches.  Ruskin 
defined it as “the power of 
seeing with a vividness that 
would not have occurred to 
vague memory.” He used 
both his own experience as a 
draftsman and his extensive 
knowledge of landscape 
painting to disclose three in-
terconnected aspects of im-
agination, which he labelled 
descriptively as associative, 
contemplative, and penetra-
tive. For Ruskin, seeing, 
thinking and imagination 
were faculties to be held in 
balance as a way to get to the 
heart of the matter [4]. 
 
riting a little over 
a century later, 
Gaston Bachelard 
had the advantage of being 
familiar with phenomenological methods when he ex-
plored the types of spaces “seized upon” by the imag-
ination. “Only phenomenology,” he wrote, “can help 
us to restore the subjectivity of images, and to measure 
their fullness, their strength and their transubjectivity.” 
His interpretive source was poetry rather than paint-
ing, and the poetic images he considered were specifi-
cally those of “felicitous space.” These images led him 
to identify the imaginative functions of houses, attics, 
drawers, nests, shells, corners, and what he called “the 
intimate immensity” implicit in 
each. Every place, no matter 
how small, is simultaneously 
discrete and an imagined mi-
crocosm of the world [5]. 
For her wonderful book, 
The Ecology of Imagination in 
Childhood, Edith Cobb used 
autobiographical accounts of 
childhood to investigate the 
role of spontaneity and creative 
imagination in children’s expe-
riences of nature. What she 
found was that “Experience in 
childhood is never formal or 
abstract. Nature for the child is 
sheer sensory experience.” But 
children grow up and evolve 
out of nature into culture. Sim-
ilarly, experience of environ-
ment turns into thought about 
environment. For adults, envi-
ronmental experience tends to 
be a diffuse continuum of “na-
ture-body-mind-society” [6]. 
Environmental or, more 
specifically, geographical, ex-
perience is the theme of Eric 
Dardel’s L’Homme et la Terre, 
published in 1952. I discovered 
this short book by chance in a 
university library some 40 
years ago, and, to my 
knowledge, the work has rarely 
been referenced by anyone else. 
Dardel explores what he called 
geographicality (géographi-
cité)—the relationships and ex-
periences that bind human beings to the earth, which 
he considered to be fundamental aspects of human ex-
istence. To elaborate his ideas, he used the expressive 
writings of early 20th-century regional geographers 
that he filtered through his own experiences of differ-
ent types of environments, including the sky, oceans, 
shorelines, mountains, barren plains, cities, and city 
streets. Dardel suggested that geographicality is mani-
W 
56






fest in landscape—an assemblage that “is not, in its es-
sence, made to be looked at, but is rather an insertion 
of people into the world, a place of life’s struggle, the 
manifestation of our being and that of others” [7]. 
 
henomenological description can be based on a 
reflective analysis of one’s own experiences, 
but this method can lead to narrow subjectivity 
and is, frankly, very difficult to write about. For me, it 
makes better sense to try to hone skills of seeing and 
observation and then to find ways to access the inter-
subjective experiences of others. In addition to their 
own careful observations, Ruskin worked from paint-
ings, Bachelard from poetry, Cobb from autobiog-
raphies, and Dardel from geographical essays. 
In my view, however, the quintessential example 
of phenomenological description based on the experi-
ences of others is William James’ The Varieties of Re-
ligious Experience, a book that probably  had a sub-
stantial impact on the thinking of both Heidegger and 
Wittgenstein. James wrote in the introduction that his 
book is an elaboration of “the feelings, acts and expe-
rience of individual [human beings] in their solitude, 
so far as they stand in relation to whatever they con-
sider divine” [8]. 
James did not refer to his method as phenomeno-
logical. Instead, he called it either empirical or prag-
matic, though the essence of his approach, like phe-
nomenology, is to study direct experiences and to 
avoid theoretical speculation. His writings incorporate 
a survey of subjective phenomena recorded in litera-
ture by “articulate and self-conscious” people who had 
no special erudition but “lie along the beaten high-
way.” 
His descriptions of religious experience follow 
what he referred to as an existential point of view that 
embraces both unremarkable, everyday experiences of 
faith in different religions, and also mysticism, intense 
moments of conversion, and what he referred to as pa-
thologies, exaggerations, and perversions. To grasp 
the variety of religious experiences, he focussed on 
particular cases and claimed, in an echo of Goethe and 
Ruskin, that “One must know concrete instances first. 
One can see no farther into a generalization than just 
so far as one’s previous acquaintance with particulars 
enables one to take it in.” 
 
or me, these different approaches to phenome-
nological description share a strong family re-
semblance because they address the question of 
how this phenomenon—be it place, landscape, build-
ings, space, nature, silence, imagination, being, reli-
gion, or the earth—is experienced. 
These thinkers demonstrate that while there are 
different ways to answer this question, they all require 
the hard work of clear seeing and careful thinking. 
Early in his account of his life at Walden Pond (which 
I am inclined to regard as a phenomenological account 
of the practice of dwelling), Thoreau wrote: 
 
Let us settle ourselves and work and wedge our feet downward 
through the mud and slush of opinion, and prejudice, and tradi-
tion, and delusions and appearance... till we come to hard bottom 
and rocks in place, which we can call reality and say ‘This is’ [9]. 
 
Notes 
1. E. Said, Orientalism (NY: Vintage Books, 1979), p. xxii. 
2. J. W. von Goethe, Italian Journey (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1970), p. 1, p. 109 [originally 1786–88].  “Clear fresh eyes” is 
an apt summary of Goethe’s general approach to science and 
nature, discussed in D. Seamon and A. Zajonc’s Goethe’s Way 
of Science: A Phenomenology of Nature (Albany, NY: State 
Univ. of New York Press, 1998). 
3. J. Ruskin, “The Nature of Gothic,” in The Stones of Venice, 
Volume II, Chapter VI, sections xv and xvi [1853]. 
4. J. Ruskin, “On Imagination,” in Modern Painters, Volume II, 
Section 2 [1846]. In a later edition, Ruskin expressed misgiv-
ings about this particular interpretation but let it stand as an 
example of his thinking.  
5. G. Bachelard, The Poetics of Space (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1969), p. xv, p. xxxiii [originally 1958]. 
6. E. Cobb, The Ecology of Imagination in Childhood (NY: Co-
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don: Longmans Green and Co., 1902). Quotations are from 
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What is Phenomenology? It may seem strange that this question has still to be asked half a century after the 
first works of Husserl. The fact remains that it has by no means been answered. 
 
—Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 1945, p. vii 
 
 century has passed since philosopher and 
phenomenology founder Edmund Husserl 
published Ideas. Almost 70 years have 
passed since French phenomenologist 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty wrote the words above, and 
his question continues to be answered in many differ-
ent ways. 
Some thinkers have interpreted phenomenology 
in light of new findings in the field of neuroscience 
and philosophy of mind, building new bridges be-
tween disciplines [1]. Others have taken phenomenol-
ogy into the field of nursing and related health-care 
fields, “helping us to grasp the ordinary, the unex-
pected, and the ineffable elements of human experi-
ence in health and illness” [2]. Many researchers  
work in the field of environmental and architectural 
phenomenology, reflecting on the meaning of place, 
embodiment, building, dwelling, and home. 
When I think of who has made a significant con-
tribution to this field, David Seamon has a prominent 
place on the podium, given his prolific list of publica-
tions and extraordinary contribution to the commu-
nity, provided via Environmental and Architectural 
Phenomenology. He received a service award from 
the Environmental Research Design Association 
(EDRA) in 2006, celebrating his accomplishments in 
advancing phenomenological possibilities within the 
field of environmental design. 
I am sure that I am not the only supporter of his 
work who feels that we could be providing him with 
a number of additional awards as well for his long ca-
reer in support of thoughtful, phenomenological re-
search. His determination to provide a forum for phe-
nomenological reflection is not only impressive but al-
ways inspirational. 
Other contemporary writers who regularly come to 
mind as key contributors to the field of environmental 
and architectural phenomenology include Bob 
Mugerauer; Ed Casey; Jeff Malpas; Edward Relph and, 
my most recent favorite, Henri Bortoft [3]. When I think 
of these researchers, I realize they have all taken the 
philosophical dimensions of phenomenology and en-
larged those concepts through interdisciplinary dia-
logue. 
Such a task is no small achievement. Classic philo-
sophical texts, not to mention dense phenomenological 
works such as Heidegger’s Being and Time or Merleau-
Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, open up vistas 
that are challenging to even the most sophisticated stu-
dent of philosophy. Yet these thinkers I’ve highlighted 
manage to take those key classic texts and build upon 
them without compromising the integrity of the original 
philosophical message. To my mind, in doing so, they 
not only validate the mission of philosophy as “ap-
plied,” but they take phenomenology into the lived 
world and truly change it for the better. 
My sense is that phenomenology is applied philos-
ophy, in the true sense of the term. As a method, it 
serves to remind us of the significance of the full range 
of meaning of human experience, including taken-for-
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granted assumptions, values, and perceptions often 
forgotten in analytic frameworks. In attending to pre-
thematic ways of being-in-the-world, phenomenology 
helps to comprehend human behavior in its fullness.  
The larger task is to find ways in which phenom-
enology can take that understanding and provide guid-
ance in the actual, deliberate design of better places. 
Challenges remain in terms of both revealing implicit 
paradigms, values, and experiences of place, as well 
as applying that knowledge to our city-building prac-
tices. There has been much accomplished since Hus-
serl; at the same time, there is much more to be done. 
That promise ensures that phenomenological work 
will continue, particularly in the interdisciplinary “ap-
plication” to specific urban-design challenges. 
Let me end by extending my congratulations to 
EAP and to David Seamon for keeping the phenome-
nological project on the right track for decades. May 
he continue to do so for many years to come! 
Notes 
1. See the work of Evan Thompson, including Waking, Dreaming, 
Being: New Light on the Self and Consciousness from Neurosci-
ence, Meditation and Philosophy (NY: Columbia University 
Press, 2014, forthcoming); and The Embodied Mind: Cognitive 
Science and Human Experience (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1991). 
2. Nursing and the Experience of Illness, I. Madyar and J. Walton, 
eds. (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 1; see also P. Munhall, Revi-
sioning Phenomenology: Nursing and Health Science Research 
(London: Jones and Barlett, 1994). 
3. See R. Mugerauer, Interpretations on Behalf of Place (Albany, 
NY: State Univ. of New York Press, 1994); E. Casey, Getting 
Back into Place (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 2009); J. 
Malpas, Place and Experience (London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 
1999); E. Relph, Place and Placelessness (London: Pion, 
1976/2008); Henri Bortoft, The Wholeness of Nature (Hudson, 
NY: Lindesfarne Press, 1996); and Taking Appearance Seriously 
(Edinburgh: Floris Books, 2013).
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hould I begin with an example drawn from 
field notes in the life of a practicing phenom-
enologist? The time and place: June, 2014, in 
Hildesheim, Germany [1]. Three paths: 
 
 The path through the countryside from which one plunges 
into the trees at a certain spot, unexpectedly emerging at a 
small structure filled, for my German colleague Rolf, with 
the memory of the sounds made by a Japanese musician 
(sounds that accompanied the silence perfectly); 
 The path that led us around the little lake, conversing all the 
while, after our dinner with Professor Ogawa; 
 The path we took more than once (and at different times of 
day) between Rolf’s home and the campus. 
 
Already, several possible experiential structures 
emerge: 
 
 Experiencing a path as a direction to a goal, even if the goal 
is not known in advance to someone taking this path for the 
first time; 
 Experiencing a path that brings us back to where we started, 
even though we continually moved forward in a single di-
rection; 
 Experiencing a path linking two places—now one is the 
starting point and the other is the destination, then later in 
the day they exchange roles as we travel the path in the op-
posite direction. 
 
In the last case, both Rolf’s home and the places 
where the seminar met (including the grassy, tree-
sheltered space behind the building as well as “our” 
room inside) work as “destinations,” each at their own 
time. But neither destination is arbitrary or indifferent. 
They reflect our destinies, whether the seminar group 
as a whole is engaged in a collective experiment in 
phenomenological practice at the university, or Rolf 
and I are back home discussing phenomenology with 
the help of good wine and a full moon or a summer 
thunderstorm. In other words, when Rolf and I walk 
the pathway between his home and the campus, this 
makes sense for us because we are also fellow sojourn-
ers following a pathway of inquiry and exploration we 
call “phenomenology.” 
 
his lived connectedness stands out even more 
clearly for me when I recall the memorable night 
that five of us from five different countries gath-
ered for dinner, an occasion not merely for some good 
German beer but for outstanding camaraderie and much 
laughter. On one level, we were at the restaurant in that 
particular small hotel because it was where two of us 
were staying as well as being “on the way” home for the 
rest of us. 
More profoundly, however, we were together at that 
specific place and time because our life-paths had con-
verged, coming together not only through a shared com-
mitment to the phenomenological tradition, but through 
our complementary work with the lived body, move-
ment, and dance. With such colleagues, one can em-
brace at a doorway—a threshold—to say goodbye at a 
time of literal, physical parting, yet remain companions 
(whether for a while or for a lifetime) on the “path with 
a heart.”  
Here it is clear that, even though I initially set out to 
describe a path as a feature of the natural and built 
worlds, I find myself describing a multi-dimensional 
experience in which the possibility of following a path 
of phenomenological practice plays as great a role as the 
bricks, gravel, and earth of the visible paths beneath our 
feet. In what follows, I accordingly explore some reso-
nances between certain experiential possibilities of 
paths as elements of lived landscapes and similar struc-
tures emerging in the lived experience of phenomenol-
ogy itself—or more specifically, phenomenological 












s a first example, consider someone walking 
along and coming to a fork in the path. This 
path branches off in two directions, offering 
two ways to proceed, and to go on at all, one must 
make a decision (Bloomer and Moore 1977, 86). One 
example of this structure in phenomenological prac-
tice involves a fundamental choice of method: Hus-
serl’s path of description, or Heidegger’s path of in-
terpretation? [3]. 
Here, it is striking that the notion of  “pathway” is 
often used to characterize Heidegger’s life and work 
(e.g., Pöggeler 1989). Thus, it is entirely fitting that 
the motto for his Gesamtausgabe—the project de-
voted to publishing all of his writings—speaks of 
“pathways, not works” [4], especially since 
Heidegger himself often refers to paths in a number of 
connections. Some examples: 
 
 He uses a particular country path of his youth as an occasion 
for interpretation (1981); 
 He sets a conversation in motion along a different country 
path (1966); 
 He draws on the word “pathmarks” as the title for one col-
lection of essays (1998); 
 In the original German title of another collection (2002), he 
recovers, beneath the conventional use of the word 
Holzwege to indicate being led astray (being on the wrong 
track), its original meaning—paths leading into a forest or 
wood. 
 
In the last example, he uses the original under-
standing of Holzwege to suggest paths that simply 
lead where they lead, even if the region they wander 
through contains no traditionally canonized “destina-
tion.” He even links the notion of language as a “path” 
or “way” (Weg) with the Tao (1971a, 92f.) and con-
trasts the act of traversing a path already there with 
the work of clearing a way (as across a snow-covered 
field) and keeping it open, bringing it forth as a path 
for the first time (1971a, 129ff.). 
When we set forth in the pregiven world, it is the 
path itself that walks us, so to speak, requiring us to 
adjust our gait with its steppingstones and stairs, in-
viting us to move swiftly ahead or to ramble and lin-
ger. But whether the path was originally shaped by the 
erosion of stones, by animals seeking water, or by 
landscape architects, it has a history, encompassing an 
inaugural establishment or pathmaking; the gradual 
consecration of the path through repeated use; and 
perhaps a further phase in which a path no longer taken 
becomes overgrown, its destination forgotten or irrele-
vant, the world it gathers no longer shining forth [5], for 
in a Heideggerian interpretation, a path, once made, 
only keeps its world alive if we hear the call of this path-
way (1981). 
 
or Husserl, however, what first stands out is the 
need for the initial pathmaking wherever there 
are no pregiven paths to guide us. On more than 
one occasion, he turns to the image of the explorer of 
the “trackless wilderness” of an entirely new continent 
(5/154; cf. 3–1/224) [6] to describe his discovery of the 
“immense fields” of investigation (20–1/303) opened 
up by the new paths and directions of phenomenological 
research (20–1/272, 315).   
In the process, he delineates several important fea-
tures of phenomenology as a pathway of inquiry: 
 
 When we set forth on the path of phenomenological work, we 
do not know in advance what the investigation will deliver 
(HM8/347f.): The path proves its practicality and fruitfulness 
as a way to proceed only when we actually take it (34/291). 
 We necessarily proceed step by step (24/445; 20–1/273, 286; 
8/169), while at the same time remaining cognizant of the 
larger horizon (e.g., the concrete whole we ultimately want to 
explicate), since it is what orients our progress every step of 
the way (34/296) [7]. 
 As a result, the unity of the path consists of its being a path 
toward a goal—but as Husserl tells us in the same breath, the 
goal may not lie at the end of the path, but in the journey itself 
(15/419). 
 
Furthermore, Husserl’s turn to the figure of the ex-
plorer makes it clear that once a path has been made, it 
becomes intersubjectively accessible. It is true that there 
are many difficulties to overcome when first penetrating 
into the “new world” opened up by phenomenological 
practice (3–1/5)—Husserl refers in this context to “the 
path of thorny investigations” (17/251; cf. 8/169) re-
quiring “patient and constant work” (HM6/6). Once a 
way has been made, however, a second explorer can fol-
low in the footsteps of the first (20–1/325). 
It is here that Husserl emphatically identifies the 
task shared by both explorers and phenomenologists: 
namely, the task of description (20–1/326). If one actu-
ally travels to the new land, one can remain unmoved 










make the journey (5/154f.) because the explorer’s re-
ports (like those of the phenomenologist who turns to 
the phenomena themselves) are based on the firsthand 
evidence of actual experience. 
It is true that the observations made by both the 
phenomenologist and the geographical explorer can 
be incomplete so that distinctions are missed, as when 
the explorer interprets what will turn out to be two dif-
ferent rivers as parts of one (20–1/322). But subse-
quent explorers traveling along the first explorer’s 
path may improve the descriptions (20–1/325, 3–
1/224). And not only that: What is opened up by the 
first path is a realm of inquiry where “other paths are 
possible” (17/11). 
 
or the phenomenologist, then, the “goal” is the 
exploration of the entire terrain of this new 
field, with the field of phenomenological work 
conceived as a place where new explorers taking new 
pathways will necessarily discover new features of the 
landscape or reveal new aspects of features already 
found (20–1/325). Eventually, once the main geo-
graphical structures of this new land have been re-
vealed, future generations are able to walk the paths 
together (cf. 1/48) and to carry out a thorough cultiva-
tion that goes beyond the initial explorer’s efforts 
(5/161). In each case, what is required is not merely 
knowledge “about” the goals and the methods (the 
pathways to reach these goals): “we must walk the 
paths themselves” (24/445). 
This becomes clear when we consider various 
ways in which a path can fail. For instance, we may 
find our path blocked by an unsurpassable obstacle. 
Then there is the case of a path that fails by leading 
you away from where you wanted to go, or to alter the 
example, one might be well on one’s way, only to find 
out that the path is leading you toward somewhere you 
really do not want to go. 
What these three scenarios share, however, is that 
someone was already underway on some path, and 
from the standpoint of a rigorous descriptive phenom-
enology, a pathway can also fail to be experienced as 
a pathway by not being taken. It is true that we may 
recognize a formation as a “path” when we see it on a 
map, but in such a context all points of the path are 
given simultaneously and no direction of travel is 
privileged. 
In contrast, for situated experiencers who are not 
simultaneously “here” and “there” but continually bear 
their lived “here” within themselves, the experience of 
actually taking a path involves being at a certain loca-
tion at each moment (whether at a beginning or already 
underway) and proceeding in a certain direction (even 
if there is no fixed and pregiven goal or no discernible 
end as long as one lives). Moreover, it is true that the 
literal pathways we encounter in everyday life exist in 
an already-constituted space and take measurable time 
to traverse. 
 
et if we are actually to “walk the paths them-
selves” (24/445), rather than merely talking or 
thinking about doing so, our ongoing experi-
ence will necessarily display the most fundamental 
structure governing primal temporalization, primal spa-
tialization, and primal motility: “this/more,” as “this” 
now spills over into the immediately “next” now, and as 
each fresh actualization of my kinaesthetic possibilities, 
of my capability for “more” movement, opens “more” 
space—the immediately adjacent stretch of the path my 
movement is taking (Behnke 2009, §5.1). In this way, a 
path is a promise redeemed step by step, and the only 
way a path can keep its promise is if we correlatively 
accept its invitation and walk the path itself, following 
wherever it leads. 
Along the way, however, we find side paths, inter-
sections, byways, paths that lead to other paths, sign-
posts to distant destinations, and so on. There are also 
places where pathways meet—places celebrated as spe-
cial nodes of activity, interchange, and mutual enrich-
ment and influence (cf. Alexander et al. 1977, pattern 
30). 
Yet this is also true of phenomenological pathways. 
For me, Environmental & Architectural Phenomenol-
ogy is not only a nexus where many pathways, coming 
from many different directions, can meet, but an inspi-
ration for those exploring the experiential dimension to 
set forth on pathways of their own, secure in the 
knowledge that there is more than one way to go about 
the task.  
By providing a forum for all such explorers’ reports 
of their journey, EAP has become a place that is hospi-
table to a genuine conversation among pathways. For 
decades, EAP Editor David Seamon has served as the 










lively, diverse discussions. On behalf of the commu-
nity that this place has gathered, I therefore offer you, 
David, our most grateful thanks.   
 
Notes 
1. I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Rolf Elberfeld for inviting me 
to the University of Hildesheim to share my work as part of 
his series of seminars on experimental and transformative phe-
nomenology. 
 2. Here, it is not possible to provide a complete phenomenology 
of paths; for some starting places, see Norberg-Schulz 1971, 
ch. 2; Alexander et al. 1977, patterns 30, 36, 52, 120, 121; 
Bloomer and Moore 1977, ch. 8; Seamon 1979, 28, themes 4 
and 14. It is likewise impossible to present a full account of 
the extensive use of the figure of the “path” or “way” in Hus-
serl and Heidegger. 
3. See Delius 1952–53. Of course, the situation can be more com-
plex, e.g., a thinker can use both methods, or other approaches, 
such as Goethean phenomenology, may come into play. 
4. Cf., e.g., Seamon 1979, 29: “Phenomenology is as much a pro-
cess as a product ....” 
5. See Heidegger 1981 on a path gathering a world; on the world 
gathered by a bridge—which for Norberg-Schulz is “a partic-
ularly expressive path” (1971, 26; cf. 53f.)—see Heidegger 
1971b, 152ff. 
6. All references in this form refer to Husserl 1950ff., cited by 
volume/page number; citations from Husserl 2001ff. follow 
the same convention using the abbreviation HM. 
7. Cf. Casey 1993, 278ff., on a kind of “double-tracking” where 
at each stage of my journey I experience my current “here” in 
relation to the “there” I’m headed for; see also Alexander et al. 
1977, pattern 120, on experiencing paths in terms of interme-
diate goals. 
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